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Abstract
This thesis examines subthreshold operation for reducing power consump-
tion and protection against power analysis attacks of digital CMOS circuits.
Subthreshold operation is considered the most efﬁcient way to reduce the
power consumption of CMOS.
There are few studies analyzing the performance of sequencing ele-
ments in subthreshold region. Sequencing elements play an important part
of clocked sequential circuit systems.Therefore, it is necessary to have a
good understanding of the different design types and their applicability in
subthreshold circuits.
In this thesis, different ﬂip-ﬂop designs commonly used in super-
threshold systems are compared in subthreshold operation. According to
process corner simulations, a PowerPC 603 type ﬂip-ﬂop operates success-
fully in all corners in a 65 nm process down to a power supply voltage of
125mV. This ﬂip-ﬂop has a delay time of 28.7 ns and a power consumption
of 2.4 nW in the typical corner. The power consumption decrease corres-
ponds to a reduction factor of 20 000, compared to normal operation.
As cryptographic algorithms have become more secure against crypto-
analysis attack, several types of attacks exploiting physical emitted inform-
ations have been reported. Power analysis attacks use the power consump-
tion pattern to attack the chip. An increasing demand for secure data com-
munication makes it even more important to design with resistance against
side channel attacks in mind for certain applications.
Operating in subthreshold region signiﬁcantly reduces the signal amp-
litude and the dynamic power consumption component. The reduction of
these elements is used to create a S-box for the AES encryption cipher with
increased resistance against power analysis attacks. By running with sub-
threshold operation, the correlation between power consumption of differ-
ent input values decreases with a factor of 2 500 at the cost of 350 times
delay degradation.
Simulations in 90 nm and 65 nm processes provided by STMicroelec-
tronics are performed in Cadence Virtuoso Platform.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Techniques for reducing the power consumptions in power-hungry Very
Large Scale Integrated Circuit (VLSI) systems are presently becoming a
major challenge and obstacle for future development of Complement-
ary Metal-Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) technology. The International
Roadmap for Semiconductors states that power management is now the
primary issue across most application segments [1]. In a 45 nm CMOS pro-
cess, you can ﬁt more than 2000 transistors across thewidth of a human hair
[2]. When all transistors switch billions of times per second they consume
an enormous amount of energy compared to the area, which is dissipated
as heat.
Moore presented in 1965 a prediction of further downscaling of
Integrated Circuit (IC) technology by doubling the transistor density every
18 months [3]. Fig. 1.1 illustrates the exponential increase in transistor
count in Intel ®Processors over the last 37 years. The increased packing
density has been accompanied with increased speed, and has lead to
an enormous increase in heat generation. The total chip performance is
limited by the thermal dissipation capability of the mounted IC package of
many of today’s circuits [4].
With further downscaling of CMOS technology into deep submicron
region even more transistors will be squeezed into an even smaller area.
Power consumption in CMOS devices must be reduced to allow further
development.
Another recent topic of interest, with the increased demand for secure
communication presently is side-channel attacks. A cryptographic cipher
implemented in an IC produces variation in power consumption and
electromagnetic radiation due to switching activity of transistors. These
variations are easily measurable with physical access to the IC and may
be used to extract internal information from the circuit. With increased
strengthening of cryptographic algorithms against cryptoanalysis, several
types of attacks exploiting this physical emitted information have been
1
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Figure 1.1: Moore’s law Microprocessor Chart. Intel ®Corporation 2007
reported (e.g. [5, 6, 7]). Physical attacks on the implementation of the
circuit, exploiting physical measurable information emitted by the device
are referred to as side-channel attacks.
Side-channel attacks have become amajor security threat to implement-
ation of modern cryptographic ciphers immune to cryptoanalysis attacks.
An increasing demand for secure data communication makes it more im-
portant to design with protection against side-channel attacks in mind for
certain applications. Attacks on modern cryptographic ciphers have been
reported to extract the correct 128 bit secret key within 3 minutes [8].
This thesis addresses both the performance of sequencing elements
in the subthreshold region and techniques for improving the resistance
against power analysis attacks with subthreshold operation in 4 papers
included in the thesis.
1.1 Motivation
Power consumption management is becoming of primary concern in the
design of modern IC. Subthreshold operation is attained by reducing the
operating voltage of the chip below the transistors threshold voltage.
Reducing the power supply voltage is regarded as the most direct and
dramatic means of reducing power consumption [9]. Subthreshold
operation results in huge decrease of power consumption at the expense
of decreased maximum switching frequency. Operating CMOS circuits in
their subthreshold region is a promising method for reducing the power
dissipation of ultra-low-power-application.
2
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Few studies have been done on performance of sequencing elements
in the subthreshold region. As sequencing elements play an important
part of clocked sequential circuit systems, it is important to have a good
understanding of which type of design to choose in different applications
in a subthreshold CMOS system. In this thesis different ﬂip-ﬂop designs
commonly used in superthreshold systems are compared in subthreshold
operation. The comparison is done with respect to delay time, power
consumption, Power-Delay Product and Energy-Delay Product. Process
corner performance is also simulated.
Increased resistance against power analysis attacks is obtained by redu-
cing the signal magnitude [5]. Subthreshold operation reduces the signal
amplitude signiﬁcantly and can be used to increase resistance against side-
channel attacks by reducing the power consumption. Reducing the signal
amplitude by reducing the supply voltage makes it harder to measure the
variation in power consumption. Normal arithmetic functions and a cryp-
tographic function, the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) S-box oper-
ation, are tested for improved power analysis resistance with subthreshold
operation through simulations.
1.2 Previous Work
Since the early years of CMOS technology, it has been well known that
the power consumption is reduced when lowering the supply voltage.
A CMOS counter circuit using reduced supply voltage was presented by
Leuenberger and Vittoz in 1969 [10]. The effect of voltage scaling for
reducing the power consumption of a CMOS counter circuit was explored.
Operating transistors in the subthreshold region has been a well known
method for reducing the power consumption for a long time. In 1972,
Swanson and Meindl explored the lower bounds of supply voltage [11],
which they derived as 8kT/q, approximately 200mV at room temperature.
This limit has later been reduced.
Subthreshold operation has gained renewed research interest in recent
years as the demand for low power devices has increased. Research activity
on the subthreshold operation increased in the early 90’s. E.g. Burr and
Shott reported an encoder/decoder circuit in 1994 operating at 200mV [12].
In thismillennium there has been a lot of research on subthreshold oper-
ation, e.g. at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Purdue University and
University of California, Berkeley. Some subthreshold circuit implement-
ations are listed in Tab. 1.1. Works in the area of minimizing energy con-
sumption [13, 14, 15], optimizing devices’ performance [16] and increasing
the robustness of subthreshold logic [17] are also worth mentioning. After
this work was initiated the only extensive work known on sequencing ele-
ments in subthreshold operation is a comparative study on ﬂip-ﬂops by Fu
3
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Table 1.1: Overview of some subthreshold applications
Year Application Ref
1994 Encoder-decoder circuit at 200mV [12]
2005 FFT-processor at 180mV [15]
2006 SRAM circuit at 190mV [19]
2007 Add-Compare-Select (ACS) unit at 180mV [20]
2007 SRAM circuit at 160mV [21]
2007 Programmable Register ﬁle at 200mV [22]
2008 CPU processor below 200mV [23]
and Ampadu published in 2007 [18].
Side-channel attacks on electronic circuit was ﬁrst reported by Kocher
et al. in 1996 [24]. Three years later Kocher et al. introduced power
analysis attacks [5]. After the theoretical introduction to these attacks by
Kocher et al. the topic has gained much interest in recent years. Practical
implementations of attacks have been presented, as well as means of
improving resistance against attacks.
1.3 Overview of the Thesis
This thesis examines subthreshold operation for reducing power consump-
tion and protection against power analysis attacks of digital CMOS circuits.
The thesis includes a collection of 3 published papers and one
unpublished paper, which will be submitted for conference inclusion.
• Paper I presents seven subthreshold ﬂip-ﬂop cells characterized with
respect to metrics such as speed, power dissipation, Power Delay
Product and Energy-Delay Product.
• Paper II takes a deeper look at three ﬂip-ﬂop cells, which are
characterized both in a 65 nm and 90 nm process. Differences
between technologies are presented and simulations in different
process corners are performed.
• Paper III examines the effect of subthreshold operation for increasing
resistance against power analysis attacks by simulations on an 8-bit
full-adder circuit.
• Paper IV contains further examinations on the effect of subthreshold
operation for increased resistance against power analysis attacks on
the implementation of the AES S-box.
In addition to the technical papers, a separate introduction to the work
(this part) is organized as followed:
4
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• Chapter 1 presents the motivation for working with digital sub-
threshold CMOS and lists a selection of previous works done on top-
ics of interest.
• Chapter 2 gives an introduction to subthreshold CMOS modelling
and power estimation.
• Chapter 3 presents the operation of ﬂip-ﬂops and different measures
for comparing the performance of different ﬂip-ﬂops.
• Chapter 4 gives an introduction to side channel attacks and reported
countermeasures against them.
• Chapter 5 gives a brief introduction to the Advanced Encryption
Standard and presents the implementation of the Rijndael S-Box.
• Chapter 6 presents a summarization of the included papers.
• Chapter 7 is a discussion of this thesis contributions.
• Chapter 8 gives a summarization and conclusion to the work done in
this thesis, and lists some ideas for future work in the ﬁeld discussed.
Two appendices are also included:
• Appendix A includes schematic drawings and transistor sizing of
CMOS cells used in this thesis and included papers.
• Appendix B presents additional simulation results (not published).
5
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Chapter 2
Subthreshold Operation
2.1 Introduction
Among the most promising methods for reducing the power consumption
of VLSI, reducing the power supply voltage offers the most direct and
dramatic means of reducing the power consumption [25, 9]. Presently,
subthreshold operation is considered to be the most energy-efﬁcient
solution for low-power applications where performance is of secondary
importance [15, 26].
A transistor is said to operate in its subthreshold region when the
gate-source voltage, Vgs, is below the absolute voltage of the transistor’s
threshold voltage, Vt. The power supply voltage, VDD, is reduced below
the threshold voltage for ensuring subthreshold operation.
As the technology evolution proceeds, mobile electronic devices are
continuously emerging in new areas with new usability. This leads to an
increasing demand for device designs offering low power consumption.
Reducing the power consumption with subthreshold operation has been
known for decades [11]. In recent years, subthreshold operation has
received more attention due to the increasing demand for power-efﬁcient
electronics. Applications well suitable for subthreshold operations include
wearable medical equipment such as hearing aids and pacemakers, wrist-
watch computers, self-powered devices and wireless sensor networks
[27, 15, 28].
2.2 CMOS Power Consumption
CMOS has emerged as the mainstream technology in modern VLSI
design during the past decades. A major factor contributing to the
success of CMOS over the past decades has been its power consumption
characteristic. In traditional CMOS technologies operating with a power
supply voltage well above the transistor’s threshold voltage, Vt, signiﬁcant
7
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power consumption only occurs during transistor switching between on
and off state.
When estimating the total power consumption in a device or system
two different power dissipation components must be taken into account.
Dynamic power consumption is due to charging and discharging of load
capacitance and short-circuit current drawn directly from the power supply
to ground when both pMOS and nMOS transistors are partially on.
Static power consumption is always present in a powered up circuit. This
component is due to non-ideal currents of CMOS transistors.
The total power consumption can be expressed as the sum of these two
components [29]:
Ptotal = Pstatic+ Pdynamic (2.1)
Static power consumption has traditionally been a negligible part of the
total power consumption compared to the dynamic power consumption.
But due to increased leakage it must be taken into account in modern
CMOS processes. The understanding of the static power consumption is
therefore important for estimating power consumption in modern CMOS
technologies. The static power consumption is a composition of different
leakage currents. Static power dissipation is mainly due to subthreshold
leakage current and gate leakage current [29]. Other leakage effects include
junction leakage, hot-carrier injection leakage, gate-induced drain leakage
(GIDL) and punch-through leakage currents [30].
2.2.1 Traditional Modelling of Power Consumption
The dynamic component of the power consumption has been dominating
in traditional CMOS technologies, and static power consumption has
usually not been taken into account when estimating the total power
consumption. Taking only the dynamic power consumption into account,
power dissipation occurs only when a transistor changes state by charging
and discharging the load capacitance. The current drawn from the power
supply during these transitions is illustrated in Fig. 2.1. In a digital
integrated circuit system such capacitances are mainly input gates of the
next transistors in the signal path.
The average dynamic power consumption is a square function of the
supply voltage VDD, and can be approximated to [31]:
Pdynamic =
1
2
·α · CL ·V2DD · f (2.2)
where α is the probability of a signal transition within a clock period
(0 ≤ α ≤ 1), CL is the circuit capacitance to switch, VDD is the power
supply voltage and f is the clock frequency.
8
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1→ 00→ 1
Figure 2.1: Current ﬂows in a CMOS inverter during transitions
2.2.2 Leakage Current Problems in Modern CMOS System
The instantaneous power, P(t), drawn from the power supply is propor-
tional to the supply current, iDD(t), and the supply voltage, VDD. Over
the past decades VDD has decreased from typical 5 V down to typical 1 V
in present state-of-the-art processes. As the dynamic power consumption
quadratically depends on the supply voltage, according to Eq. 2.2, a result
of this has been a dramatic reduction in the dynamic power consumption.
While the dynamic power consumption has decreased, the static leakage
currents have simultaneous increased, due to thinner gate-channel isola-
tion layer and lowered threshold voltage.
Subthreshold leakage current is the current ﬂowing between the source
and drain node of a Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor Field-Effect Transistor
(MOSFET) when the gate-to-source voltage, Vgs, is below the threshold
voltage, Vt.
As the leakage current increases exponential when threshold voltage
decreases, leakage is emerging as a major problem for modern deep
submicron CMOS processes. Subthreshold leakage power can consume as
much as 60% of the total power in a 65 nm technology [32]. A formula for
modelling the subthreshold leakage current is given in Sec. 2.3.
Although subthreshold leakage is considered an undesirable effect
by most digital circuits, it is the cornerstone in subthreshold circuits.
Subthreshold circuits utilize the leakage current as the conduction current.
The gate leakage current is the current ﬂowing through the oxide layer
insulating the gate from the channel. Thickness of the oxide layer has
decreased proportional to VDD [33]. The probability of carriers tunneling
through the insulating layer increases exponentially with decreased oxide
thickness. For gate oxide thickness less than 15-20 Å, gate leakage current
becomes comparable to subthreshold current [29]. The gate leakage current
contribution was simulated to 40% of the total inverter off current in a
90 nm process in [13]. The contribution to the total leakage current is
9
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Figure 2.2: nMOS transistor current Ids as a function of VDD, Vgs = VDD
rapidly diminished when the supply voltage is decreased.
The on-current going through a N-channel MOSFET (nMOS)-transistor,
Ids, in a 90 nm CMOS process is plotted as the function of the power supply
voltage, VDD, in Fig. 2.2. As seen in the ﬁgure, the Ion/Ioff ratio can be
reduced with as much as a factor of approximately 103 if VDD is reduced
from 1V down to 150mV.
By operating the circuit’s transistors in their subthreshold region,
transistors are never fully turned on. Instead they are varying between
being turned off and partially turned on, starting to conduct subthreshold
leakage current to a greater degree. While the dynamic power consumption
increases quadratically with the supply voltage, the maximum clock
frequency increases only linearly with the supply voltage [4]. The static
power consumption contribution exceeds the dynamic when operating at
very low supply voltage [13].
When transistors are operated in the subthreshold region, power
consumption is dramatically reduced without the need for major design
changes of the circuit. This region has been regarded as the ’OFF’ region in
traditional circuit design.
2.3 Modelling of Subthreshold Leakage Current
It is essential to use an accurate model for calculating the subthreshold
leakage current and other currents present in this region for estimation
of power consumption. A list of important parameters inﬂuencing a
transistor’s subthreshold drain-source current is given in Tab. 2.1.
The drain current of a nMOS transistor operating in subthreshold,
10
Subthreshold Operation
Table 2.1: Important MOSFET subthreshold current model parameters
Symbol Description Unit
vT =
kT
q Thermodynamic Voltage V
Vt Threshold voltage V
V0 Early voltage V
n Slope factor no unit
µ Mobility of electrons in the channel m2/(V · s)
Cox Oxide capacitance per unit area F/m2
W
L Width/length ratio no unit
κ Technology dependent constant no unit
Vgs < Vt, can be modelled as [26]:
Ids = I0e
κVgs
vT e
(1−κ)VbsvT
(
1− e
−Vds
vT +
Vds
V0
)
(2.3)
where I0 is the zero-bias current for the device, as given in Eq. 2.4. Vgs is
the gate-to-source potential, Vds is the drain-to-source potential and Vbs
is the substrate-to-source potential (body-bias). V0 is the Early voltage,
proportional to the channel length. κ gives the effectiveness for which the
gate potential is controlling the channel current, normally in the range 0.7-
0.75 [26]. The thermal voltage, vT , is calculated as vT = kT/q, where k is the
Boltzmann’s constant, T is the temperature and q is the elementary charge.
At room temperature (T = 300K), vT is about 26mV. The threshold voltage,
Vt, varies with length, width, Vds, Vbs, temperature and processing [29], as
well as the body effect as described in Sec. 2.6.
Typical parameters for a 2µm n-well process are I0 = 0.72 aA, κ = 0.75
and V0 = 15V [26]. The current changes by a factor 10 for an 80mV change
in Vgs or a 240mV change in Vbs (up to 100 nA, which is the limit of the
subthreshold region).
I0 may be expressed as [34]:
I0 = 2nβv2T = 2nµnCox
W
L
v2T (2.4)
where β is the technology dependent transconductance factor.
2.4 Lower Bounds of CMOS Supply Voltage
Swanson and Meindl derived in 1972 equations suggesting a minimum
useful supply voltage of 8kT/q for inverters operating in weak inversion
11
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Table 2.2: Ideal-case minimum supply voltage VDD for given circuit design
constraints [4]
Constraint VDDmin VDDmin
(T = 300K) [vT]
Amax > 1 (ring oscillator) 36mV 1.40
NM > 10% (inverter) 55mV 2.13
Amax > 4 (standard design) 83mV 3.22
FU > 9 (fan-in of 3) 83mV 3.22
Ion/Io f f > 104 (dynamic logic) 238mV 9.22
[11]. At room temperature this compares to approximately 200mV. By
further research in the area, Schrom et al. reported in 1996 an analytic
absolute lower bound of supply voltage [4]. This absolute lower bound
assumes ideal and perfectly symmetrical devices, not likely achievable
by any CMOS technology according to [35]. The lowest bounds of
supply voltage for a CMOS inverter is 36mV at a temperature of 300K,
corresponding to the minimum-inverter-gain criterion.
Achievable values for minimum supply voltage for various design
constraints, calculated and presented in [4], are listed in Tab. 2.2. Minimum
supply voltage VDD is given in millivolts on a temperature of 300K, and
may be estimated for other temperatures by a factor of n = S/ (vT ln(10))
where S is an achievable average gate swing as a worst-case estimate for
subthreshold operation [4].
A minimum of logic function, such as NAND, NOR and XOR,
is required to operate successfully in most circuit implementations for
practical use. In practical use a minimum value of VDD may be around
83mV, according to Tab. 2.2.
2.5 Sizing for Subthreshold Operation
For optimal performance, transistors in a pull-up and pull-down network
should be able to drive the same current. In traditional design, pMOS
sizing is done proportionally to nMOS with the relationship Wp = 2 ·Wn.
But the optimum pMOS/nMOS ratio varies with the supply voltage. In the
subthreshold region it is highly dependent on process variation as well [15].
Requirements for power consumption, minimum supply voltage and yield
requirements must be taken into accounts when dimensioning transistors.
Minimum sized devices minimize power consumption but can reduce
the functionality of circuits at low supply voltages, thus limiting the
minimum supply voltage [36]. Minimum sized devices are theoretically
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Figure 2.4: Transistor channel conduction at different supply voltages
optimal for reducing energy per operation when accounting for the impact
of sizing on voltage and energy consumed [13].
Symmetrical devices give minimum VDD operation [36]. The optimum
pMOS/nMOSwidth ratio forminimumVDD can be obtained by comparing
currents in the devices. With the setup from Fig. 2.3, the transistor
current as a function of VDD is plotted in Fig. 2.4(a), with Vgs = VDD for
the STMicroelectronics 90 nm and 65 nm general purpose processes. The
corresponding n/p ratios are calculated and plotted in Fig. 2.4(b). For
both plots minimum sized transistors with Wn = Wp and Ln = Lp have
been used. Remembering that the current through the transistor is linear
dependent on theW/N the idealWp/Wn ratio can be found.
The variation in threshold voltage due to random doping ﬂuctuations
is proportional to 1/
√
WL, causing minimum sized devices to produce the
worst case random Vt variations [14].
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2.6 Body-Bias Regulation
The body effect is a second-order effect, occurring due to potential
difference between the source and body of a transistor [29]. It can be
modelled as an increase in the threshold voltage Vt for a nMOS transistor
that occurs when the source and substrate have different voltage potentials.
With this effect taken into account, the threshold voltage for a n-channel
transistor is[37]:
Vt = Vt0 +γ
(√
Vsb + |2ΦF| −
√
|2ΦF|
)
(2.5)
where Vt0 is the threshold voltage without body effect (Vsb = 0), ΦF is the
difference between the Fermi potential of the substrate and intrinsic silicon
(approximated to 0.35V at room temperature for typical doping levels).
The factor γ, often called the body-effect constant, is:
γ =
√
2qNAKSε0
Cox
(2.6)
where NA is the doping concentration, KS is the relative permittivity of
silicon, ε0 is the permittivity of free space and Cox is the gate oxide
capacitance. The body-effect constant is proportional to the doping
concentration.
Body-bias regulation can improve the inverse subthreshold slope S due
to reduced short-channel effects and reduce the junction capacitances by
increasing the junction depletion widths [16]. These effects lead to faster
operation and lower power consumption in a subthreshold device. For
example, a 19% decrase in the switching delay and 30% reduction in the
Power-Delay Product (PDP) of an inverter is obtained in [16] by applying
a reverse body-bias of 150mV.
Body-bias regulation has been presented as a promising method for
decreasing Vt variations [38]. Threshold voltage is stabilized by regulating
the back-gate voltage of transistor with a small bias regulator circuit.
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Sequential Computing
A major part of digital VLSI systems is designed as a clocked sequential
system, using a global clock to synchronize the system. The activity of such
a system is controlled by the global clock, which triggers registers all over
the system at the same time.
A sequencing element, connected to the global clock, is used to synchron-
ize data. Combinational logic is placed between the sequencing elements,
as illustrated in Fig. 3.1. The purpose of a sequencing element is to enforce
sequence, to distinguish the current token from the previous or next token
[29].
The two most commonly used sequencing elements are flip-flops and
latches. Flip-ﬂops and latches can mainly be separated into how the output
signal is changed when the input signal changes. When the input signal
ﬂows directly through to the output the element is said to be transparent.
Latches are transparent while the clock signal is high, while ﬂip-ﬂops are
not transparent at any time.
Sequencing
element
Sequencing
element
Tper
data
Combinational Logic
clk
Global clock
Figure 3.1: Clocked sequential system
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Figure 3.2: D ﬂip-ﬂop symbol
3.1 Flip-Flops
Flip-ﬂops are an important building block in modern digital VLSI systems.
Some of the major usage areas of ﬂip-ﬂops are in registers, pipelines and
state machines, ensuring sequencing of data.
A ﬂip-ﬂop has the ability to read an input value, save it for some time
and then write the stored value somewhere else, even if the element’s input
value has subsequently changed.
Based on the comparison of the power breakdown for different
elements in VLSI chips, latches and ﬂip-ﬂops are the major source of the
power consumption in synchronous systems [39]. Flip-ﬂops have a direct
impact on power consumption and speed of VLSI systems. Therefore study
on low-power performance of ﬂip-ﬂops are important. When estimating
the power dissipation of a system, ﬂip-ﬂops may be a major power
consumption component.
In this thesis, the delay flip-flop (D ﬂip-ﬂop) is used [40]. This type of ﬂip-
ﬂops can be interpreted as a primitive delay line or zero-order hold, since
the data is posted at the output one clock cycle after it arrives at the input.
It is called delay ﬂip-ﬂop because the output takes the value of data-in from
the previous clock period.
The operation of a D ﬂip-ﬂop can be expressed as:
Qnext = D (3.1)
where Qnext is the output value in the next clock period and D is the input
value sampled at the rising edge of the clock signal for the start of the clock
period.
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Figure 3.3: Flip-ﬂop timing diagram
3.2 Flip-Flop Performance Characterization
Signiﬁcant parameters in characterizing a ﬂip-ﬂop’s performance are its
delay time and power dissipation. An optimal ﬂip-ﬂop design has low
power consumption, imposes no delay and gives a valid output at all
time. Trade-offs between these parameters must be done in practical
implementation.
3.2.1 Timing and Delay
For estimating the performance of a ﬂip-ﬂop, three important timings and
delays are used: (1) propagation delay, (2) setup time and (3) hold time.
Setup and hold time deﬁne the relationship between the clock and input
data, while the propagation delay deﬁnes the relationship between the
internal delay for the input signal to propagate through the ﬂip-ﬂop and
change the output signal.
The total delay of a sequencing element can be expressed as the time
from the input signal changes its state to the output signal is stabilized.
A ﬂip-ﬂop can capture an input signal even though it arrives later than
the setup time, but the propagation delay might increase, resulting in a
large total delay[29].
Propagation Delay
The propagation delay of a ﬂip-ﬂop is deﬁned as its clock-to-output delay.
This equals the maximum delay from the arrival of the clock’s active edge
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to the output of the ﬂip-ﬂop is considered stable. Usually the propagation
delay differs from low to high transition and high to low transition. By
deﬁnition, the delay is the maximum value of these two delay:
tpcq = max
(
tpcqLH , tpcqHL
)
(3.2)
Clock Contamination Delay
The clock contamination delay is theminimum time from the clock changes
to the output is available that occurs when the data input arrives early.
I.e. the time it takes from the clock goes high to a valid output signal is
available.
tccq = max
(
tccqLH , tccqHL
)
(3.3)
Setup Time
The input must be stable for some time before the ﬂip-ﬂop triggers at the
clock edge. The setup time is deﬁned as the time the data value must
remain stable around the arrival of the clock’s active edge to ensure that
the ﬂip-ﬂop retains the proper output value.
The setup time may differ for a low-to-high and high-to-low transition.
Setup time is by deﬁnition the maximum of these values:
tsetup = max
(
tsetup,LH, tsetup,HL
)
(3.4)
Hold Time
After the clock signal has changed, the input must be hold for a period of
time to allow the signal to propagate through the ﬂip-ﬂop for ensuring a
stable output. This delay time is called hold time. The hold time may be
negative, which means that the input signal may change before the clock
changes and still ensuring the proper output value. As for other timing
measurements, the hold time may differ for a low-to-high and high-to-low
transition. The hold time is deﬁned as:
thold = max (thold,LH, thold,HL) (3.5)
Total Delay
The delay of a ﬂip-ﬂop can be expressed as the time taken from the input
changes its state to the output has stabilized. The total delay can be
expressed as tdelay = tsetup + tpcq, where tsetup is the time taken for the
input to propagate and stabilize in the ﬂip-ﬂop, and tpcq is the time taken
from the clock goes high to a valid output Q is available.
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Figure 3.4: PowerPC 603 ﬂip-ﬂop: tdelay vs tsetup
In Fig. 3.4 simulation of tdelay vs. tsetup has been done at VDD = 200mV.
It is clearly shownhow the delay is directly dependent on the time the input
signal arrives in relationship to the clock signal. At the left side of the plot,
the input signal exceeds the clock edge, and the output is not valid. At the
right side the output signal monolithically grows due to increased tsetup.
3.2.2 Power Consumption
A common method for measuring the power consumption of a ﬂip-ﬂop is
to operate the ﬂip-ﬂop at maximum operating frequency with a maximum
power consumption pattern applied on the input. The power consumption
is then measured as the average supply current drawn by the ﬂip-ﬂop with
input buffers and some load taken into account.
The average power consumption P can be deﬁned:
P = iVDDavg ·VDD (3.6)
where iVDDavg is the average current drawn from the power supply by the
circuit over the time being measured and VDD is the power supply voltage.
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3.2.3 Performance Metrics
Power-Delay Product
Both power and delay are metrics which can be adjusted individually.
Therefore they are usually not considered as good ﬁgure-of-merits for a
design or circuit. The Power-Delay Product (PDP) is the product of delay
time and power consumption, taking both metrics into account. PDP is
considered a good ﬁgure of merit for a circuit’s performance.
PDP is calculated as:
PDP = tdelay · P (3.7)
where tdelay is the delay found in Sec. 3.2.1 and P is the power consumption,
as deﬁned in Sec. 3.2.2.
Energy-Delay Product
The Energy-Delay Product (EDP) weights the execution time more than
PDP. EDP is considered a relatively implementation neutral metric, causing
architectural improvements contributing most to both performance and
energy efﬁciency to stand out [41].
EDP can be expressed as:
EDP = PDP · tdelay = tdelay · tdelay · P (3.8)
where PDP is the Power-Delay Product found in Sec. 3.2.3, tdelay is the
delay found in Sec. 3.2.1 and P is the power consumption, as deﬁned in
Sec. 3.2.2.
3.2.4 Metastability
A ﬂip-ﬂop is a bistable device, meaning it has two stable states (0 and 1).
The binary decision which the ﬂip-ﬂop must take to set the output can
take an unbounded amount of time in the case of colliding inputs [42].
When a ﬂip-ﬂop experience this, it is said to be in a metastable state where
the output is at an indeterminate level between 0 and 1 [29].
When the output of a ﬂip-ﬂop in a metastable state is sampled by
other digital circuitry, non-binary signals will propagate through the binary
systems. This effect is called a synchronization failure.
Metastable states cannot be totally avoided when designing a systems,
but the probability of occurrence can bemade reasonably small with careful
consideration of timing.
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3.3 Flip-Flop Designs
The basic method for designing a ﬂip-ﬂop cell is to combine two latches
with complementary non-overlapping clock signals. Two common types
of characterization of ﬂip-ﬂop designs is to separate them into static and
dynamic designs.
Static ﬂip-ﬂop designs have some sort of feedback to retain its output
value indeﬁnitely. Dynamic ﬂip-ﬂop designs do not have this type of
feedback, generally maintaining their value as charge on capacitors. If the
ﬂip-ﬂop is not refreshed for a long period of time, the charge will leak away
[29]. A static master-slave ﬂip-ﬂop cell can be made dynamic by removing
its feed-back elements. Dynamic ﬂip-ﬂops are prone to internal dynamic
node discharge. The storage capacitances in a dynamic ﬂip-ﬂop must be
periodically refreshed, otherwise the charge on these nodes will leak away
resulting in invalid data [39].
Another commonly used ﬂip-ﬂop design is sense-ampliﬁed based ﬂip-
ﬂops. A sense-ampliﬁed based ﬂip-ﬂop has a sense ampliﬁer on its input
gates (D and its complementary value). The sense ampliﬁer is followed by
a normal static latch to retain the output signal.
Many other ﬂip-ﬂop architectures have been presented. For example,
the Semi-Dynamic Flip-Flop (SDFF) and Hybrid Latch Flip-Flop (HLFF)
designs are commonly used in conventional circuit implementations. Due
to their high power consumption these cells have not been considered in
this thesis [39].
Schematic drawings and transistor sizings for ﬂip-ﬂops reviewed in
Paper I and II are shown in A.2.
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Chapter 4
Side-Channel Attacks
4.1 Introduction
Cryptography is extensively used in modern electronic communication for
protecting message secrecy, ensuring personal privacy and proving mes-
sage authenticity. Cryptographic algorithms have after extensive academic
research over the past decades evolved to be secure against known math-
ematical cryptoanalysis attacks. However, in recent years several attacks
based on the physical implementation of electronic cryptographic systems
have been presented.
A cryptographic system is only as secure as its weakest link. It has
become of primary concern for an increasing number of researchers that
the physical implementation is the weakest link of many cryptographic
systems.
This chapter intend to investigate the vulnerability against side-channel
attacks in modern cryptographic circuits. Side-channel attacks use physical
measurements of informations such as time delay, power consumption and
electromagnetic radiation for ﬁnding secret keys inside the circuit.
Theoretical background on the nature of power consumption in CMOS
technology, an introduction to cryptography and the different types of side-
channel attacks is given in Sec. 4.2. In Sec. 4.3, proposed countermeasures
against side-channel attacks are presented.
4.2 Theoretical Background
4.2.1 Cryptography
The term cryptography refers to the study of secret messages [43]. In
modern communication over the Internet, cryptography is of primary
importance for secure communication, keeping privacy, ensuring message
authenticity and access control. Information transmitted over the Internet
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passes nodes neither controlled by the sender nor the receiver and may
easily be eavesdropped.
The purpose of an encryption algorithm is to protect the secrecy of
messages sent over an insecure channel [44].
Lots of processing are required for encryption and decryption of data.
With large data ﬂows, dedicated cryptographic hardware is used to keep
upwith the speed. Dedicated cryptographic hardware is also considered to
be more secure than software implementation because secret cryptographic
keys can be kept in a controlled environment, specially designed for
secure keeping. Nevertheless, cryptographic ICs are also vulnerable
against break-in-attempts. Attempts on breaking in through the physical
implementation of a cryptographic IC are called side-channel attacks.
A cipher is a cryptographic algorithm for transposing a known input text
to be hidden from eavesdropping, plaintext, into a ciphertext. A ciphertext
contains the same information as the plaintext, but in a format not readable
unless you know the cipher being used and a secret key. The key is used as
an input to the cipher and controls the operation of the cipher. Without a
correct key it is impossible to transform the ciphertext back into the original
plaintext.
Encryption, or enciphering, is the transformation of a plaintext P into a
ciphertext C. The operation is performed by a cipher as C = EK(P), where
E is the encryption algorithm of the cipher and K is the provided key.
Decryption, or deciphering, of a ciphertext C is the transformation back
to readable text by the receiver, by performing P = DK(C) = DK(EK(P)),
where D is the decryption algorithm.
Ciphers can be divided into two main categories, transposition and
substitution ciphers. Substitution ciphers replace letters or large blocks with
substitutes. Transposition ciphers rearrange the letters in the plaintext.
Product ciphers are created by composing substitution and transposition
ciphers. The cryptographic ciphers deﬁned by the US National Institute of
Standard and Technology (NIST) as the Data Encryption Standard (DES)
[43] in 1976, as well as its proceeder, the Rijndael cipher [43], selected
as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) by NIST in 2002, are well
known examples of product ciphers used as a base inmajor communication
systems today.
4.2.2 Side-Channel Attacks
Modern ciphers are designed to be immune against known cryptoanalysis
methods, and therefore attacks on them are hard to perform. But when
cryptography is used in computer systems these ciphers are prone to attack
on the physical implementation.
A cipher implemented in an electronic circuit produces timing inform-
ation, power consumptions variations due to switching activity and radi-
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ates electromagnetic energy, which can easily be measured at low costs [5].
Such side channel informations can provide a source of information which
can be used to break the cryptographic circuit in order to recover the secret
encryption key the device is using.
Side-channel attacks can be categorized by the side-channel informa-
tion they are exploiting. The ﬁrst theoretical presentation of a side-channel
attack was reported by Kocher in 1996 [24], analyzing the difference in time
used by different inputs.
Kocher presented the concept of power analysis attack in 1999 [5].
This type of attack was performed on an actual implementation of a
cryptographic circuit by Örs in 2004 [45]. Power analysis attack uses
the variation in power consumption correlated to the operations done in
calculating the secret key being used.
A side-channel attack may require considerable technical knowledge of
the internal operation of the system on which the cryptographic algorithm
is implemented.
Timing Attack
Implementations of cryptographic systems where the execution time of
certain operations differs depending on the input values are vulnerable
against timing attacks. Differences in the execution time are often delib-
erately implemented in the algorithm by the designer for performance op-
timization. Kocher showed in [24] that it is possible to ﬁnd the entire secret
key of a vulnerable cryptographic system only by timing measurements.
By careful algorithmic and electronic design, timing attacks can be
completely avoided by making the system run in ﬁxed time.
Simple Power Analysis Attack
In a simple power analysis (SPA) attack, the power consumption of a cryp-
tographic IC is measured directly during cryptographic operations. Using
a set of power consumption measurements taken across a cryptographic
operation an attacker can directly determine information about a device’s
operation and the secret key [5].
SPA can be used to break cryptographic implementations in which
the execution path depends on the data being processed, exploiting the
relationship between the executed operations and the power leakage [45].
Differential Power Analysis Attack
While SPA attacks are used to reveal power variations in the execution path
due to the instruction sequence, differential power analysis (DPA) attacks can
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reveal effects correlated to data values being manipulated [5]. This type of
attack is also referred to as correlation power analysis [46].
A differential power analysis attack is hard to protect against, as it uses
statistical and error-correcting methods to extract secret information from
a power consumption signal [47].
In a DPA attack, the attacker uses a predictionmodel of the device being
attacked. This model is used for predicting the amount of side-channel
output for a certain moment of time in the execution of the cipher. These
predictions are correlated to the real side-channel output of the circuit by
applying statistical methods. Some common statistical methods used in
DPA are the distance-of-mean test and the correlation analysis [45].
Electromagnetic Radiation Attack
Electromagnetic radiation is leaked from all electronic devices. A magnetic
ﬁeld is produced when motion occurs in the electronic current ﬂowing
in the circuits. An electromagnetic analysis (EMA) attack measures the
electromagnetic radiation, and the attack can be performed during the
same methods as for power attacks [48].
Fault Analysis Attack
Fault analysis attacks are not directly side-channel attacks. They can be
placed under the category of implementation attacks, as they exploit the
physical working environment required by the system.
Fault analysis attacks can be divided into two categories. A differential
fault analysis attack exploits a circuit by changing the operating voltage,
tampering with the clock, or applying radiation of various types to the
circuit. By measuring the output differences from the output of the
circuit at normal operation, a circuit vulnerable to differential fault analysis
attacks may reveal secret key information.
A non-differential fault analysis attack is based on causing permanent
damage to a circuit for the purpose of extracting symmetric keys.
4.3 Countermeasures against Side-Channel Attacks
The goal of countermeasures against side-channel attacks are to decrease
or preferably completely remove any side channel information leaked by
the chip.
Countermeasures can be done at several layers of the cryptographic
system. Beginning on the top-level, protocol and algorithmic countermeas-
ures can be done. At a lower lever, physical electronic countermeasures
can reduce the side channel information emitted. Fig. 4.1 illustrates the
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Figure 4.1: Security pyramid of an embedded system [49]
different layers. To ensure security in embedded systems, security meas-
ures must be addressed in all abstraction layers [49].
4.3.1 Algorithmic Countermeasures
Algorithmic countermeasures address the problem of side-channel attacks
in the design of a cryptographic algorithm. By taking realistic assump-
tions about the underlying hardware into account when designing a cryp-
tographic system, side-channel attacks can be made much more difﬁcult to
accomplish.
For example, nonlinear key update procedures can be employed to
ensure that power traces cannot be correlated between transactions [50].
Aggressive use of exponent and modulus modiﬁcation processes in public
key schemes can also be used to prevent attackers from accumulating data
across large numbers of operation [50].
This may solve the problem, but it does require design changes in the
algorithms and protocols themselves, which are likely tomake the resulting
product non-compliant with standards and speciﬁcations.
4.3.2 Electronic Countermeasures
Electronic countermeasures are taken on the hardware design level. The
goal of such countermeasures is to minimize side-channel information
leakage by careful design of the logic gates. Such countermeasures are
independent of the cryptography algorithm and may be implemented as
standard hardware libraries [8].
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Blinding
Kocher proposed in [24] a technique for preventing timing attack. By
adapting techniques used for blinding digital signatures it is possible to
prevent the attacker from knowing the input of themodular exponentiation
operation. The correlation between the input data known to the attacker
and the time used is removed. This makes it impossible to calculate the
secret key by timing attacks, while the cipher still may use performance
optimization on modular exponentiation operations.
Adding noise
Adding noise to a signal helps hiding the secret key, because the statistical
evaluation is worse and it is required more measurements if it is noisy.
It is important to ensure that added noise does not affects the internal
operations of the chip, as it may cause malfunction.
Reducing signal variation
The ultimate goal of a reduction in the signal variation is to attain a constant
power consumption. In [8], Tiri speciﬁes two conditions which must be
satisﬁed to have a constant power consumption:
• a logic gate must have exactly one switching event per signal
transition
• the logic gate must charge a constant capacitance in that switching
event
Some differential logic styles have been presented to meet these
conditions. For instance, wave dynamic differential logic (WDDL) was
presented in [8]. The goal of these countermeasures is to balance the power
consumption of the logic gates to be insensitive to switching activity and
thus not create any side-channel information.
By reducing the signal amplitude power consumption will also be
decreased. An attacker will require more samples to be able to perform
a differential power analysis because of more noise. However, an attacker
with an inﬁnite number of samples will still be able to perform DPA on the
signal [51].
Bouesse et al. reduced the power supply voltage to 0.4V [52]. The
reduction in supply voltage with a factor of 3 resulted in a reduction of
the energy consumption with a factor of 8.
Operating transistors in the subthreshold region reduces the signal
amplitude signiﬁcantly and decreases the signal-noise ratio. This will be an
advantage in a cryptographic system making it harder to get side-channel
information. This also has a signiﬁcant effect on the power analysis.
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The dynamic power consumption component is not the signiﬁcant power
consumption part in subthreshold region, but rather the static component,
independent of the signal and switching activity.
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Chapter 5
Advanced Encryption Standard
Substitution Box
Implementation
National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST) announced in 1997
a competition for a new cryptographic algorithm, as the successor of
the aging Data Encryption Standard (DES). In 2000, the Rijndael cipher
was announced as the winner of the competition. One year later, NIST
announced the new Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm as
approved in Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 197 [53].
The ﬁnal AES algorithm is almost identical with the Rijndael algorithm,
designed by Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen [53]. Rijndael supports a
larger range of block and key sizes than AES. AES is currently one of the
most popular algorithms for symmetric key ciphers [54], and is offering a
straight-forward software and hardware implementation.
The best known software implementations of AES achieve about 15
cycles/byte on a modern PC [55]. Hardware implementation can speed
up encryption signiﬁcantly.
One of the major building block in AES is the SubBytes operation,
also called Substitution box (S-box), which substitutes bits in a non-linear
operation. The SubByte transformation is used to obscure the relationship
between plaintext and ciphertext. In Paper IV, the S-box is implemented in
90 nm CMOS process and simulated in super- and subthreshold operation,
exploring the power analysis attack resistance in subthreshold operation.
5.1 The Advanced Encryption Standard
AES is a block cipher cryptographic algorithm, operating with a block
size and key length which can be chosen independently to be 128, 192
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Figure 5.1: AES encryption round structure
or 256 bits. Depending on block and key lengths, a different number of
steps, called rounds, are performed to encrypt or decrypt data. Each round
consists of four operations, called layers: SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns
and AddRoundKey. According to the standard, the basic units of the AES
algorithm is an 8-bit byte, but these operations can as well be performed on
32-bits words. The round structure of AES is illustrated in Fig. 5.1.
The input and output of the AES algorithm each consists of sequences of
128 bits. These sequences are referred to as blocks. The Cipher Key for the
AES algorithm is a sequence of 128, 192 or 256 bits. Other input, output and
Cipher Key lengths are not permitted [56].
AES is designed to be simple, resistant against all known algorithmic
attacks, and to offer fast and compact code on many platforms. The major
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building blocks of the AES algorithm are the non-linear S-boxes (SubByte-
operation) and the MixColumn-operation. A hardware implementation
may require up to 20 instances of the S-box, depending on the throughput
and clock frequency requirements [57]. The implementation of the S-Boxes
mainly determines the efﬁciency of a hardware implementation in terms of
area, throughput and power consumption.
5.2 Finite Field Arithmetic
All bytes in the AES algorithm are interpreted as finite field elements. The
following section introduces the mathematics needed for implementation
of the AES S-Box.
A ﬁnite ﬁeld contains a ﬁnite set of elements, completely known.
Finite ﬁeld arithmetic differs from standard arithmetic, as all arithmetic
operations result in an element within the same ﬁeld. The operations
addition, subtraction, multiplication and division are deﬁned in ﬁnite ﬁelds
[58].
A ﬁeld K of order pn is denoted GF(pn) and contains pn elements. The
letters GF are the abbreviation for Galois field, which is another name of
ﬁnite ﬁelds, named after Évariste Galois. The prime p is the characteristic
of the ﬁeld K and the positive integer n is called the dimension of the ﬁeld
over its prime ﬁeld GF(p). Each ﬁeld K of order pn must contain the prime
ﬁeld GF(p) [59]. When the characteristic of the ﬁeld is 2, it is conventional
to express elements of the ﬁeld as binary numbers.
Finite ﬁelds are important in coding theory and is a central part of many
cryptographic algorithms. The AES algorithm’s S-box uses a ﬁnite ﬁeld on
the form GF(28).
5.2.1 Polynomial Representation of Finite Fields
It is often advantageous to represent ﬁnite ﬁelds as polynomials when
doingmathematical operations. The elements of the ﬁnite ﬁeld K ∈ GF(2n)
can be represented as polynomials of degree strictly less than nwith binary
coefﬁcients. The resulting polynomials are n-dimensional vectors over the
binary ﬁeld GF(2).
Operations are then performed modulo the irreducible polynomial P(x)
of degree n. A polynomial is irreducible if and only if its only divisors are
one and itself.
For the AES algorithm, the irreducible polynomial is [56]:
m(x) = x8 + x4 + x3 + x+ 1. (5.1)
It is possible to do operations on a reduced order ﬁeld by mapping
an element a from GF(28) to GF(((22)2)2) such as the two ﬁelds are
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Table 5.1: Polynomial representation of reduced ﬁelds
Field Bit representation Irreducible polynomial
GF(2) b0 n/a
GF(22) b1x + b0 Px(x) = x2 + x+ 1
GF((22)2) b3xy + b2y + b1x + b0 Py(y) = y2 + y+φ
φ ∈ GF(22)
GF(((22)2)2) b7xyz + b6yz + b5xz + b4z Pz(z) = z2 + z+ λ
+b3xy + b2y + b1x + b0 λ ∈ GF((22)2)
x0 x1 x1 x1x0 x0 x0
y1 y0 y1 y0
z1 z0
x1
b7 b6 b5 b4 b3 b2 b1 b0
b3 b2 b1 b0
b0
b0
b1
GF((22)2)
GF(((22)2)2)
GF(22)
GF(2)
xyz yz xz z xy y x 1
MSB LSB
Px(x)
Pz(z)
Py(y)
Figure 5.2: Binary representation in composite ﬁelds
isomorphic using an isomorphism. To reduce the complexity of operations
elements in GF(22n) can be represented as polynomials of ﬁrst degree with
coefﬁcients from GF(2n) to reduce the complexity. The ﬁeld GF(22n) is
generated as an extension ﬁeld of GF(2n) using an irreducible polynomial
P(x) = x2+αx+β, whereα,β ∈ GF(2n)). The ﬁeld GF(22n) is then a ﬁeld
extension of degree 2 over GF(2n) and can be represented as polynomials
of ﬁrst degree with coefﬁcients from GF(2n), i.e. K = px+ q, p, q ∈ GF(2n).
Any higher power of the irreducible polynomial, e.g. y2, is reduced
according to the primitive polynomial, e.g. y2 = y+φ [60].
General polynomial representations of reduced ﬁelds in GF(2), GF(22),
GF((22)2) and GF(((22)2)2) are listed in Tab. 5.1. Binary representations of
polynomials in the ﬁelds are illustrated in Fig. 5.2 [60].
5.2.2 Arithmetic Operations on Finite Fields GF(2n)
Arithmetic operations on ﬁelds with characteristic 2, i.e. GF(2n), are of
interest for the S-box implementation and will be discussed in this section.
Arithmetic operations needed by the S-box are addition, multiplication
and multiplicative inverse. Using polynomial representation, addition and
multiplication are relatively trivial operations to implement in hardware.
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Calculation of the multiplicative inverse of a number is not a trivial
operation and will be described in the next section.
Addition is achieved by adding the coefﬁcient for the corresponding
powers in the polynomial vectors in GF(2n) for the two elements. The
addition can be implemented in hardware with the binary operator
exclusive OR (XOR) [58].
Multiplication in GF(2n) is deﬁned as polynomial multiplication
modulo the irreducible polynomial P(x) of degree n of the ﬁeld [58]. The
multiplication operation can be described mathematically as:
p = q · r modP(x) (5.2)
where p, q, r are polynomials of order GF(2n) and P(x) is the irreducible
polynomial for the given ﬁeld.
Unlike addition, there are no simple hardware operations that corres-
ponds to this multiplication. The hardware implementation used for per-
forming this operation is described in Sec. 5.4.2.
5.2.3 Multiplicative Inverse
A non-trivial and costly operation in the S-box is calculating the multiplic-
ative inverse over the ﬁeld GF(28). The inverse of an element a, i.e. a−1,
is calculated such that a · a−1 ≡ 1modP(x), where P(x) is the irreducible
polynomial [55].
The simplest technique for ﬁnding an inverse element for any a ∈
GF(2n) 6= 0 is using a table look-up from a pre-generated table. As the
table look-up approach is costly to implement in hardware due to large
area demands, it is common to use the extended Euclidean algorithm and
composite ﬁeld arithmetics to reduce the implementation size [61, 62, 55,
60].
Using the extended Euclidean algorithm, multiplicative inverse in
GF((2n)m) can be deﬁned recursively in terms of a sub-ﬁeld GF(2n) and its
extension GF((2n)m) [60]. By using polynomial representation of the ﬁnite
ﬁeld the problem of calculating the inverse in GF(28) can be translated to
calculating the inverse in a smaller ﬁeld. The multiplicative inverse of an
arbitrary polynomial bx + c is given by:
(bx + c)−1 = b(b2β+ bcα + c2)−1x + (c+ bα)(b2β+ bcα + c2)−1 (5.3)
when the irreducible polynomial is P(x) = x2 +αx +β [61].
When Eq. 5.3 is applied recursively down to the base ﬁeld GF(2), the
equation consists of operations which can be performed in the subﬁeld
GF(2m). The repeating degree-2 extensions are done using different
irreducible polynomials listed in Tab. 5.1 [60]. By using this procedure,
the multiplicative inverse operation may be implemented in hardware, as
described in Sec. 5.4.2.
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Figure 5.3: Multiplicative inverse, GF(((22)2)2)
5.3 Rijndael S-Box
The Rijndael S-box performs the SubBytes operations of the AES algorithm.
The main operation of the S-box is to calculate the multiplicative inverse to
a given 8-bit number over a ﬁnite ﬁeld GF(28).
In most AES software implementations, the S-box is pre-generated into
a look-up table, offering easy implementation and fast operation. This
approach can also be taken when designing a hardware implementation,
but such implementations are very area-demanding. By using composite
ﬁeld arithmetic a compact S-box with reduced computation cost may be
realized [62]. Regardless of chosen solution, the S-box results in the biggest
element in the AES algorithm.
5.3.1 S-Box Operation
The S-box function of an input byte a consists of the two following two
transformations:
Inverse: The multiplicative inverse in the ﬁnite ﬁeld GF(28) is calculated,
b = a−1. For the special case a = 0x00, b = 0x00.
Affine transformation: The following afﬁne transformation is applied
over GF(2):
bi = ai ⊕ a(i+4)mod8 ⊕ a(i+5)mod8 ⊕ a(i+6)mod8 ⊕ a(i+7)mod8 ⊕ ci (5.4)
for 0 ≤ i < 8 where ai is the ith bit of the byte, and ci is the ith bit of a
byte c with the value 01100011. The afﬁne transformation element of
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↓
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Figure 5.4: Implementation of the compact S-box
the S-box can be expressed in matrix form as:


b0
b1
b2
b3
b4
b5
b6
b7


=


1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1




a0
a1
a2
a3
a4
a5
a6
a7


+


1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0


5.4 S-Box Circuit Implementation
Designing a compact S-box is one of the most critical challenges for
reducing the total circuit size of the AES hardware [62]. A compact S-box
reduces the power consumption signiﬁcantly by reducing the number of
gates. Large reduction in implementation area is obtained by using ﬁnite
ﬁeld arithmetic to reduce the ﬁelds order GF(28) to GF(((22)2)2) [62, 55, 60].
The S-box implementation selected is based on the implementation
described by Satoh et al. [62], with the size optimization of Mentens et al.
implemented [55].
As illustrated in Fig. 5.4, the compact S-box implementation consists of
three stages:
Stage 1: Map all elements of the ﬁeld A to a composite ﬁeld B, using an
isomorphism function δ.
Stage 2: Compute the multiplicative inverse over the ﬁeld B.
Stage 3: Map all elements of the ﬁeld B back to A, using the isomorphism
function δ−1.
5.4.1 Isomorphism, Inverse Isomorphism and Affine Transform-
ation
The S-box implementation uses the isomorphism suggested by Mentens
et al. in [55], which results in a small implementation. The isomorphic
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mapping used is:


b0
b1
b2
b3
b4
b5
b6
b7


=


1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1




a0
a1
a2
a3
a4
a5
a6
a7


where ai, bi ∈ GF(2) are the coefﬁcients of a ∈ GF(28), b ∈ GF(((22)2)2).
The resulting inverse transformation with afﬁne transformation is:


b0
b1
b2
b3
b4
b5
b6
b7


=


1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0




a0
a1
a2
a3
a4
a5
a6
a7


+


1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0


The corresponding irreducible polynomials are:
GF(22) : P(x) = x2 + x+ 1
GF((22)2) : P(y) = y2 + y+φ
GF(((22)2)2) : P(z) = z2 + z+ λ
whereφ = {10}2 and λ = {1100}2 .
Mappings and afﬁne transformation are implemented by bit-addition
using exclusive-OR gates. Schematic drawing of isomorphism fromGF(28)
to GF(((22)2)2) can be found in Sec. A.4.1. Inverse isomorphism and afﬁne
transformation are combined. The schematic drawing is shown in Sec.
A.4.2.
5.4.2 Multiplicative Inverse Computation
By implementing Eq. 5.3 recursively down to GF(2) it is possible to
implement the multiplicative inverse operation in hardware.
The multiplicative inverse cell is constructed of addition and multiplic-
ation cells. Addition in GF(2n) is implemented by doing exclusive-OR of
corresponding bits of two numbers. Implementation of multiplication is
described below.
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Figure 5.5: Multiplier A× B, GF(28)
Multiplication
A Mastrovito composite ﬁeld multiplier [60] is used to perform the
multiplication. The multiplier may be represented as:
AB(x) = x((AL + AH)(BL + BH) + ALBL + λAHBH + ALBL (5.5)
where AH, BH are the most signiﬁcant half of the variables and AL, BL
are the least signiﬁcant half of the variables. Circuit implementation is
illustrated in Fig. 5.5, and is applied recursively using subﬁelds of lesser
degree to deﬁne the multipliers until the base ﬁeld GF(2) is reached [60].
In GF(2), multiplication is implemented with the AND operation of the
corresponding bits. The AND-gate is implemented as a NAND-gate
followed by an inverter. The constant multiplication by λ is implemented
as a circuit containing XOR gates.
5.4.3 Pipelining
Pipelining can be implemented for improving the throughput of the S-box.
The S-box implementation is divided into four pipeline stages in the test
setup in Paper IV. For optimal pipelining, the same amount of logic should
be placed in every stage of the pipeline. The delay of each stage is estimated
by counting elements in the longest datapath of each stage, as listed in Tab.
5.2.
The multiplicative inverse cell is separated into 3 stages for best
distribution of calculation between the 4 pipeline stages. Latency of each
stage is estimated and presented in Tab. 5.3. The delay of XOR and AND
gates are estimated to 35 ns, and 40 ns for the overhead added by the ﬂip-
ﬂop at 200mV, and the corresponding clock period is set to 400 ns. At 1V,
the delays are set to 80 ps and 185 ps, respectively. The clock period at 1V
is set to 1 ns. Pipeline stages are inserted as illustrated in Fig. 5.6.
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Table 5.2: Datapath gate count calculation
S-box stage XOR-gates AND-gates
Isomorphism 5 0
Multiplicative Inverse 18 4
Inverse Isomorphism and 5 0
Afﬁne Transformation
Table 5.3: Calculation of latency in pipeline
Stage Cell XOR-gates AND-gates Latency
1 Isomorphism 5 0 215 ns
2 Multiplicative Inverse 7 1 320 ns
3 Multiplicative Inverse 7 2 355 ns
4 Multiplicative Inverse,
Inverse Isomorphism and 9 1 390 ns
Afﬁne Transformation
4
4
4
4QD
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QD
C
QD
C
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Figure 5.6: S-box pipeline stages
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Results
This chapter presents a brief overview of the outline and results from the
papers included in this thesis.
6.1 Paper I
Seven Subthreshold Flip-Flop Cells
Outline: A comparative study of seven different ﬂip-ﬂop cells are
performed with respect to metrics such as delay, power consumption,
Power Delay Product and Energy Delay product. Flip-ﬂops are important
building blocks in many synchronous digital designs, as well as important
parts of state machines. The seven considered ﬂip-ﬂop architectures are:
(1) Basic Nand, (2) Transmission-gate Master-Slave (TGMS), (3) C2MOS,
(4) PowerPC 603, (5) True Single-Phase Clock (TSPC), (6) Dynamic TGMS,
(7) Dynamic C2MOS.
Results: All ﬂip-ﬂop cells are simulated with respect to the power supply
voltage in the region of 150 mV to 350 mV. The output waveform indicates
that all ﬂip-ﬂop cells are able to operate with a power supply voltage
in the given region. Power consumption is measured with an operating
frequency of 1 MHz.
Operating at a power supply voltage of 150mV, an average power
dissipation of 165.5 pWwas achieved for a dynamic and 285 pW for a static
ﬂip-ﬂop topology.
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6.2 Paper II
Three Subthreshold Flip-Flop Cells Characterized in 65 nm and 90 nm CMOS
Technology
Outline: Three ﬂip-ﬂop designs, selected from the results of [63] and [18],
are simulated with a power supply voltage ranging from 125mV to 1V.
These ﬂip-ﬂop designs are: (1) PowerPC 603, (2) Sense-ampliﬁer based ﬂip-
ﬂop (SAFF) and (3) Dynamic C2MOS. In addition to metrics simulated in
[63], process variations are taken into account by simulation at different
process corners. Simulation in 65 nm process is done in addition to 90 nm.
Results: Simulation results of all ﬂip-ﬂops are shown, measured as total
delay, average power consumption, Power-Delay Product and Energy-
Delay Product with respect to power supply voltage. Performance of all
ﬂip-ﬂops in TT, FF, SS, FS and SF process corners is shown regarding delay
and power consumption at 150mV and 1V. The relationship between the
FF and SS process corners are calculated with respect to power supply
voltage. Numbers of successful corners in subthreshold region for all ﬂip-
ﬂops are shown. Improvement factor for delay, power consumption, PDP
and EDP metrics are calculated for the PowerPC 603 ﬂip-ﬂop running with
power supply voltage of 125mV comparing to 1V. Power consumption is
measured at maximum operating frequency.
With a reduction of the supply voltage from 1V to 125mV, the power
consumption of a single ﬂip-ﬂop cell is reduced with a factor of 20 000.
6.3 Paper III
Improving Circuit Security against Power Analysis Attacks with Subthreshold
Operation
Outline: Power analysis attacks have emerged as a major security threat
in the area of secure ICs. A comparison between input data and
instantaneous power consumption is done with a power supply voltage
of 200mV and 1V for a 8 bit full adder.
Results: The correlation between the input data and the power consump-
tion is calculated by running 1 000 transient simulations on the full adder
with random input combinations. Power consumption is measured as cur-
rent drawn from the power supply voltage. A maximum current of 650 µA
is measured in superthreshold operation, while a maximum current of 0.41
µA is measured in subthreshold operation. The correlation is measured by
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calculating the standard deviation of the current drawn from the power
supply voltage of the 1 000 different transient simulations. This stand-
ard deviation is normalized, and a standard deviation of 1.0 is the max-
imum in superthreshold operation. At subthreshold operation the max-
imum standard deviation is 0.00052, which is a decrease of approximately
1 900 times. The power consumption correlation is reduced at the cost of
600 times delay time degradation.
6.4 Paper IV
Subthreshold AES S-Box with Increased Power Analysis Resistance
Outline: A compact AES S-box is implemented and tested for power
analysis resistance in subthreshold operation compared to superthreshold
operation. The S-Box operation is one of the major building blocks of
the AES algorithm. Resistance against Differential Power Analysis (DPA)
attacks is measured by calculating the correlation in the instantaneous
supply current when different input vectors are applied. The S-box is
implemented in an asynchronous version, as well as a pipelined version
for increased throughput.
Results: All 256 input combinations are simulated with a supply voltage
of 200mV and 1V. The supply current drawn from VDD and the calculation
time used is stored for each input.
The standard deviation is calculated and normalized, as in Paper III.
While the normalized standard deviation for the asynchronous S-box is
1.0 at VDD = 1V, it is reduced to 0.00040 at 200mV. This corresponds to
a reduction in the correlation between data being processed and the power
consumption with a factor 2 500, while the calculation time increases 350
times.
The throughput of the S-box is increased from 7.37Mbits to 19.88Mbits
at VDD = 200mV when 4 pipeline stages are introduced. The same factor
of decrease in correlation and increase in calculation time is obtained in the
pipelined S-box.
The calculation time, power consumption, PDP and EDP metrics for
the asynchronous S-box are measured when the supply voltage is stepped
up from 125mV to 1V. The lowest PDP value, 68.8 fJ, is obtained with
VDD = 250mV. The lowest EDP value is obtained when running at 750mV,
and it is 1.36 zJs.
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Discussion
7.1 Minimizing Power Consumption
CMOS technology stands above enormous challenges in managing the
increased power consumption in modern and future deep submicron
CMOS devices. Subthreshold operation is an effective mean for reducing
the power consumption dramatically by using existing CMOS technology
without the need for major change in system design. In combination with
massive parallelism and pipelining it may be possible to maintain high
performance and throughput while running in the subthreshold regime
[64].
Through simulations presented in Paper I, II, III and IV it is shown
that signiﬁcant reduction in power consumption is achieved by reducing
the power supply voltage. For certain applications requiring very low
power consumption subthreshold operation is presented as a promising
alternative to conventional CMOS operation. The gate delays increase
when the supply voltage is scaled down since capacitances and threshold
voltage are constant [65]. High performance application may therefore
presently not be suitable for subthreshold operation.
For most sequential circuit systems, subthreshold supply voltage does
not offer the lowest possible energy per cycle. As seen in PDP and EDP
plots in included papers, minimum values are often obtainedwith a supply
voltage somewhere in between the subthreshold region and the nominal
voltage of the process. For example, the best PDP and EDP values for the S-
box in Paper IV are obtained with a supply voltage of 250mV and 750mV,
respectively. The supply voltage offering minimum energy consumption
per cycle depends on the technology, the characteristics of the cycle, and
workload of the system [14]. Careful analysis of optimum supply voltage
should therefore be done for each design, depending on its performance
goal.
Simulation results in Paper I and II show that sequencing elements,
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represented by ﬂip-ﬂops, operatewell when power supply voltage is scaled
down into the subthreshold region.
In Paper III, subthreshold operation reduces the power consumption
on an arithmetic 8-bit function. The power consumption is reduced
signiﬁcantly in a cryptographic function with and without sequencing
elements, as shown in Paper IV.
7.2 Process Variations
Subthreshold circuits are more sensitive to process variations compared
to conventional circuits. Threshold voltage in modern processes varies
with process variations, which leads to increased variations in circuit
performance and reduced yield if threshold voltages do not match. Body-
bias regulation can be used to decrease the variation of Vt and increase the
yield [38].
Dynamic designs are more sensitive to leakage currents than static
designs, and especially the gate leakage current. Due to reduced Ion/Ioff
ratio in subthreshold operation, dynamic designs are more sensitive to
process variations. Simulation results in Paper II conﬁrm that dynamic
designs are sensitive to process variations and require a higher operation
voltage to operate successfully in all corners.
Accurate technology models are required for realistic simulations in
the simulation environment. By simulating on the schematic, parameters
depending on the physical layout of the design cannot be modelled
accurately. For example, interconnect capacitance and parasitic effects
depend on length of wires and other selections done in the physical layout.
Previous experience at the research group 1 with STMicroelectronics’ 90 nm
process indicate good compliance between schematic simulations and
actual performance of produced circuits. Presently, compliance between
model and actual performance of produced circuits in the 65 nm process
has not been tested at the group. It would be instructive to produce test
circuits for verifying the model’s accuracy. However, the 65 nm process
has only been used in Paper II for comparing with the 90 nm process and
it has not been considered to be the subject of this thesis to validate the
process model. Since the research group has good experience with the
90 nm process, it has been used through Paper III and IV. Due to restricted
project time, layout simulations were not prioritized in this project.
Statistical Monte Carlo simulations would be instructive for in-depth
examination of yield numbers. However, the total circuit yield is often
more dependent on other circuit elements than ﬂip-ﬂop, as ﬂip-ﬂops are
an integrated part of a larger circuit. For best results, ﬂip-ﬂops performing
successfully in all corners at the desired supply voltage should be chosen
1Nanoelectronic Research Group, Dept. of Informatics, Univ. of Oslo
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in implementations. Simulation results indicate that the PowerPC 603 ﬂip-
ﬂop has the highest tolerance against process variations at low voltages and
operates successfully in all corners at 125mV.
Correct functionality is crucial as many customers have requirements
down to 1-2 Defect Parts per Million (DPPM). Small defect tolerance
requires not only high yield numbers, but also a good testing environment
for manufactured devices. Testing may be difﬁcult in subthreshold region.
For example, detecting faulty parts by looking at the quiescent background
current may be difﬁcult, as the Ion/Ioff ratio is signiﬁcantly reduced.
7.3 Power Analysis Attack Resistance
Power analysis attacks have recently gained scientiﬁc research interest as
themarket for secure ICs has increased. Due to the increased use ofmodern
electronic communication systems, secure handling of data has become of
great concern when designing secure ICs.
In modern cryptographic systems, secure against known mathematical
cryptoanalysis attacks, side-channel attacks emerge as a major security
threat. TheAES algorithm is secure against known cryptoanalytic methods,
and the only known form of attacks on the AES algorithm presently are
side-channel attacks [45]. Cryptographic circuits must be designed with
minimization of side-channel leakage in mind.
Simulations in Paper III and IV have focused on the powerful DPA
attack. Power consumption of circuits with a wide range of different input
vectors is compared, and the standard deviation is calculated. DPA attacks
are harder to perform with a decreased standard deviation [5].
Research on the countermeasure effect of operating transistors in the
subthreshold region has so far almost been lacking, even though this is
one of the best known methods for decreasing both the signal magnitude
and the signal-noise ratio. Operating in subthreshold region also involves
minimizing the dynamic power consumption component of the total
power consumption, and therefore making the power consumption less
correlated to switching activity of circuitry.
By running a cryptographic IC in subthreshold operation, an increased
security against power analysis attacks is obtained by the simulation
results. Although subthreshold operation offers increased resistance
against power analysis attacks, circuits are not fully protected against
attacks as long as there exists some correlation between the processed data
and the instantaneous supply current [66]. Subthreshold operation should
be considered implemented together with other DPA countermeasure
techniques for improved resistance. Promising reported techniques worth
mentioning include differential masking, random noise addition and
blinding [66, 49, 8].
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Subthreshold operation leads to an increased execution time, which
may not be acceptable for high-performance implementation in high-
speed communication systems. In many low-power systems, such as
sensor networks, subthreshold operation offers both decreased power
consumption and increased resistance against side-channel attacks.
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Conclusion
The International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors regards power
management as the primary issue across most CMOS application segments
presently [1]. Subthreshold operation is the most dramatic way to obtain a
necessary reduction in power consumption.
Through four papers simulation results on subthreshold performance
of both sequencing and combinational logic are presented, as well as a
complete pipelined S-Box system implementedwith a combination of these
VLSI gate families.
Simulation results indicate, in addition to published works from other
authors, that subthreshold operation is a promising method for designing
future CMOS systems with strict power consumption requirements.
In general, the simulation results show that the 65 nm process offers
lower delay time but higher power consumption compared to the 90 nm
process.
Paper I examines seven commonly used ﬂip-ﬂop cells in subthreshold
operation. With an operating frequency of 1MHz a delay of 77.9 ns and a
power consumption of 165.5 pW are achieved for the dynamic C2MOS ﬂip-
ﬂop at 150mV. The PowerPC 603 ﬂip-ﬂop offers both the best delay time
and power consumption of the static topologies, with tdelay = 120 ns and a
power consumption of 285 pW at 150mV.
In Paper II, further examinations are done on three ﬂip-ﬂop cells, with
process corner’s performance and two CMOS processes taken into account.
According to the simulation results, the PowerPC 603 ﬂip-ﬂop in the 65 nm
process offers the best delay time tdelay = 28.7 ns with a power supply
voltage of 125mV, while the Sense-Ampliﬁer based Flip-Flop (SAFF) in
the 90 nm process offers the lowest power consumption Pavg = 256 pW
at VDD = 125mV. Flip-ﬂop simulations at different process corners are
taken into account. These simulations indicate that ﬂip-ﬂops are able
to operate in most process corners at very low supply voltages without
malfunctioning. The simulation results indicate that the PowerPC 603
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ﬂip-ﬂop design would be the most suitable choice of design for ultra-
low-voltage operation, as it operates successfully in all process corners at
125mV in the 65 nm process.
Side-channel attacks emerge as a major security threat in modern
cryptographic systems. Cryptographic circuit designingmust be donewith
minimization of side-channel information leakage in mind. Paper III and
IV demonstrate the increased power analysis attack resistance achieved
by running in the subthreshold regime. As indicated by simulations,
standard CMOS logic operated in the subthreshold region provides orders
of magnitude increased resistance against power analysis attacks.
Simulations on an 8 bit full adder in Paper III show that subthreshold
operation reduces the correlation between data being processed and
the power consumption with a factor of 1 900, compared to nominal
superthreshold operation.
In Paper IV, a compact AES S-box running in the subthreshold regime is
presented. The simulation results indicate an increased resistance against
power analysis attacks, as the correlation factor is reduced 2 500 times.
Increased throughput is obtained by implementing a 4 stage pipeline.
As explored in this thesis, subthreshold operation emerges as a prom-
ising mean for coping with the increased power dissipation in modern
CMOS processes. Results from Paper III and IV present subthreshold oper-
ation for increased resistance against power analysis attacks. Subthreshold
operation arises as a promising operation mode for today’s and future’s
low power CMOS circuits.
8.1 Future work
This thesis has touched into some aspects of the large and complex ﬁeld of
digital subthreshold operation. The potential of further works in the ﬁeld
is large, and some suggestions for future works are listed below:
• As subthreshold circuits are sensitive to process variations, deeper
analysis of process variations effect on power consumption and delay
time would be instructive. Simulations with temperature variations
on the overall subthreshold process variation robustness would be
of great interest. Similarly, Monte Carlo simulations on a complete
subthreshold system, such as the S-box, would be instructive for
estimating process variations.
• Body-bias regulation has been suggested as a solution for coping
with the increased process variation sensitivity. Several works with
promising results have been published. Analyzing expected yield
improvements in a subthreshold increased DPA resistant circuit with
body-bias regulation would be of interest. The AES S-box design
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implemented in Paper IV has potential for further optimizations at
the logic level using digital synthesize tools. Such tools can optimize
logic functions and replace some of the AND gates with NAND
gates for reducing area and power consumption [67]. Subthreshold
operation should be considered implemented together with other
countermeasure techniques for making cryptographic circuits more
resistant against side-channel attacks.
• To be able to test and conﬁrm key points in this thesis, a chip
implementation of a complete AES system could be produced. The
optimal goal would be to construct a complete subthresholdAES chip
with body-bias regulation implemented, as well as other proposed
DPA techniques. Due to limited project time, this was not possible to
do in the scope of this thesis.
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Chapter 9
Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CMOS Complementary Metal-Oxide Semiconductor
DES Data Encryption Standard
DPA Differential Power Analysis
DPPM Defect Parts per Million
EDP Energy-Delay Product
EMA Electromagnetic Analysis
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HLFF Hybrid Latch Flip-Flop
IC Integrated Circuit
MOSFET Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor Field-Effect Transistor
NIST National Institute of Standard and Technology
nMOS N-channel MOSFET
PDP Power-Delay Product
pMOS P-channel MOSFET
SAFF Sense-Ampliﬁer based Flip-Flop
S-box Substitution box
SDFF Semi-Dynamic Flip-Flop
SPA Simple Power Analysis
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Acronyms
TGMS Transmission-gate Master-Slave Flip-Flop
TSPC True Single-Phase-Clock Flip-Flop
VLSI Very Large Scale Integrated Circuit
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Appendix A
Schematic Drawings and
Transistor Sizing
In this chapter the different design for all simulations are presented as
schematic drawings, including transistor sizes.
A.1 Basic Logic Functions
A.1.1 Inverter
XA
P1
N1
Figure A.1.1: Inverter schematic
Transistor W90 nm (µm) L90 nm (µm)
P1 0.36 0.1
N1 0.12 0.1
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A.1.2 NAND
B
A
A B
X
P1 P2
N1
N2
Figure A.1.2: NAND schematic
Transistor W90 nm (µm) L90 nm (µm)
P1−2 0.24 0.1
N1−2 0.12 0.1
A.1.3 XOR
Complementary CMOS XOR design
This C2MOS based XOR design is used in the S-box implementation.
P4
N1
N2
P1
P2
X
B
A
B
A
B¯
B¯
A¯
A¯
P3
N3
N4
Figure A.1.3: C2MOS XOR schematic
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Transistor W90 nm (µm) L90 nm (µm)
P1−4 0.48 0.1
N1−4 0.24 0.1
Tiny-XOR design
The tiny-XOR design offers a small XOR implementation. This design was
used in the implementation of 1 bit half-adder.
N2
N1
P1 P2
B A
X
Figure A.1.3: Tiny XOR schematic
Transistor W90 nm (µm) L90 nm (µm)
P1 0.12 0.1
P2 0.12 0.1
N1 0.12 0.1
N2 0.12 0.1
A.2 Flip-Flops
A.2.1 NAND-Master-Slave Flip-Flop
The basic NANDﬂip-ﬂop is constructed out of NAND-gates. Each NAND-
based latch requires a total 16 transistors.
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φ
D
Q¯
Q
Figure A.2.1: NAND-MS ﬂip-ﬂop schematic
A.2.2 Transmission Gate Master Slave Flip-Flop
The Transmission Gate Master Slave (TGMS) ﬂip-ﬂop uses clocked trans-
mission gates.
D
φ¯
φ¯
φ φ¯
φ
φ¯φ
φ
Q
P4
P7 P5
P3
P6P8
P1
N7 N5
N2
P2
N4
N1
N8
N3
N6
Figure A.2.2: TGMS ﬂip-ﬂop schematic
Transistor W90 nm (nm) L90 nm (nm)
P1−8 0.36 0.2
N1−8 0.24 0.2
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A.2.3 C2MOS Flip-Flop
D Q
φ¯
φ
φ
φ¯
φ¯
φ
φ¯
φ
P1
P2
P3
P7
P8
P9
N2
N1
N3 N4
N5
N6
N7
N8 N9
N10
P4
P5
P6
P10
Figure A.2.3: C2MOS ﬂip-ﬂop schematic
Transistor W90 nm (µm) L90 nm (µm)
P1−10 0.36 0.2
N1−10 0.24 0.2
A.2.4 PowerPC 603 Flip-Flop
The PowerPC 603 ﬂip-ﬂop was used in the PowerPC 603 microprocessor.
It is a combination of the TGMS and C2MOS ﬂip-ﬂop designs.
φ
φ¯ φ
φ¯
D
φ¯
φ φ¯
φ
QP1
N1
P3
N3
P2 P4
N4N2
P5
N7
N8 N6
N5
P6
P7
P8
Figure A.2.4: PowerPC 603 ﬂip-ﬂop schematic
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Transistor W90 nm (µm) L90 nm (µm) W65 nm (µm) L65 nm (µm)
P1−8 0.36 0.1 0.12 0.06
N1−8 0.12 0.1 0.18 0.06
A.2.5 TSPC Flip-Flop
D φ
φ
φ
φ
Q¯ Q
P1
P2
N1
P3
N2
N3
P4
N4
N5
Figure A.2.5: TSPC ﬂip-ﬂop schematic
Transistor W90 nm (µm) L90 nm (µm)
P1 0.585 0.1
P2 0.585 0.1
P3 0.12 0.1
P4 0.24 0.1
N1 0.12 0.1
N2 0.27 0.1
N3 0.27 0.1
N4 0.54 0.1
N5 0.54 0.1
A.2.6 Dynamic TGMS Flip-Flop
φ¯
φ
QD
φ¯
φ
N1
P1
N2
P2
N3
P3
N4
P4
Figure A.2.6: Dynamic TGMS ﬂip-ﬂop
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Transistor W90 nm (µm) L90 nm (µm)
P1 0.12 0.2
P2 0.36 0.2
P3 0.12 0.2
P4 0.36 0.2
N1 0.24 0.2
N2 0.24 0.2
N3 0.24 0.2
N4 0.24 0.2
A.2.7 Dynamic C2MOS Flip-Flop
φ¯
φ
D
φ
φ¯
Q
P1
N1
N2
N3
N4
P4
P3
P2
Figure A.2.7: Dynamic C2MOS ﬂip-ﬂop
Transistor W90 nm (µm) L90 nm (µm) W65 nm (µm) L65 nm (µm)
P1−4 0.36 0.1 0.12 0.12
N1−4 0.12 0.1 0.24 0.12
Pinv 0.36 0.1 0.12 0.12
Ninv 0.12 0.1 0.24 0.12
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A.2.8 Sense-Amplifier Based Flip-Flop
φ φ
D¯D
Q¯
φ
Q
P1 P2 P3 P4
N3
N1 N2
N4
N5
N6
Figure A.2.8: Sense-Ampliﬁer Based ﬂip-ﬂop
Transistor W90 nm (µm) L90 nm (µm) W65 nm (µm) L65 nm (µm)
P1−4 0.12 0.1 0.36 0.06
N1−6 0.12 0.1 0.12 0.06
A.3 Full-Adder
A.3.1 1 Bit Half-Adder
Cout
S
B
A
TINY XOR
Figure A.3.1: 1 bit half-adder schematic
A.3.2 1 Bit Full-Adder
The 1 bit full-adder cell presented in [68]. The same transistor sizing has
been used.
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P1
BA
P3
A
P4
A
P6 P8 P9 P10
P5 P7
B
P11
P12
BA
N1
N2
N3
B
A A
B
B
B
B
A
A
N4
N5
N6
N7
N8 N9 N10
N12
N11
Cin
Cin
Cin
Cin
Cin
Cin
Cout
S
P2
Figure A.3.2: 1 bit full-adder schematic
Transistor W90 nm (µm) L90 nm (µm)
P1−12 0.4 0.1
N1−12 0.2 0.1
A.3.3 8 Bit Full-Adder
The 8 bit full-adder is constructed as a ripple-adder. A half-adder is used
for the ﬁrst bit, while full-adders are used for all other bits.
A B
Sum
Cin Cout
FAdd1
A B
Sum
Cin Cout
FAdd1
A B
Sum
Cin Cout
FAdd1
A B
Sum
Cin Cout
FAdd1
A B
Sum
Cin Cout
FAdd1
A B
Sum
Cin Cout
FAdd1
A B
Sum
Cin Cout
FAdd1
Sum
C
HAdd1
BA
Sum(0:7)
Cout
A(0:7)
B(0:7)
B(7)B(6)B(5)B(4)B(3)B(2)B(1)B(0)
S(0) S(1) S(2) S(3) S(4) S(5) S(6) S(7)
A(1)A(0) A(2) A(3) A(4) A(5) A(6) A(7)
Figure A.3.3: 8 bit full-adder schematic
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A.4 S-box
A.4.1 Isomorphism
The isomorphism (mapping from GF(28) to GF(((22)2)2)) is implemented
with exclusive-OR addition as described in Sec. 5.4.1.
8 8
in out
in7in6in5in3 in4in2in1in0
out0
out1
out2
out3
out4
out5
out6
out7
Figure A.4.1: S-box Isomorphism Cell
A.4.2 Inverse Isomorphism and Affine Transformation
The inverse isomorphism (mapping from GF(((22)2)2) to GF(28)) and
afﬁne transformation is implemented with exclusive-OR addition as
described in Sec. 5.4.1.
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8 8
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
transformation
Affine
in
in7in6in5in3 in4in2in1in0 out0
out1
out2
out3
out4
out5
out6
out7
out
Figure A.4.2: S-box Inverse Isomorphism and Afﬁne Transformation cell
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Additional Simulations
B.1 Subthreshold Transistor Sizing
Parametric simulations on the effect of sizing in the subthreshold region
have been done on a selection of circuit elements. The simulations have
made the basis for decisions done on transistor dimensioning during the
thesis. The simulations have been done with respect to delay and power
consumption.
B.1.1 Inverter
As shown in Fig. B.1, an inverter is simulated with different nMOS and
pMOSwidth ranging from 0.12µm (minimum size) to 0.40µm in the 65 nm
process with VDD = 150mV.
Simulation results indicates best delay time withWp = 0.12µm andWn
= 0.14µm. The power consumption is lowest when Wn is minimum sized
but seems to be relative independent of the pMOS width.
B.1.2 PowerPC 603
The PowerPC 603 ﬂip-ﬂop is simulated with the same test setup as the
inverter. The simulation result is plotted in Fig. B.2. All pMOS and all
nMOS transistors are set to the same width.
The lowest delay time is achieved with the same sizing as in the
inverter’s case. With Wp = 0.24µm and Wn = 0.12µm the lowest average
power consumption is obtained.
B.1.3 NAND
A NAND-gate is simulated in the 90 nm process at VDD = 200mV with
respect to delay time. The simulation results are plotted in Fig. B.3. In Fig.
B.3(b), delay time in all process corners are simulated.
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Figure B.1: Effect of transistor sizing in subthreshold on an inverter
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(b) PowerPC 603 power consumption
Figure B.2: Effect of transistor sizing in subthreshold on the PowerPC 603
ﬂip-ﬂop
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Figure B.3: Effect of transistor sizing in subthreshold on a NAND-gate
From the simulation it can be observed that minimum pMOS width
results in a large delay compared to a small increase in pMOS width. For
implementation,Wn = 0.12µm andWp = 0.16µm are chosen.
B.1.4 C2MOS XOR
The C2MOS XOR-gate (see Sec. A.1.3) is simulated in the 90 nm process
at VDD = 200mV with respect to delay time and power consumption, and
plotted in Fig. B.4. The best delay time is achieved whenWn = 0.12µm and
Wp = 0.6µm according to the simulation results, but such sizing results in
high power consumption.
B.2 S-Box Output
The S-box implemented in Paper IV has been tested to give valid output for
all input combinations, according to FIPS 197 [56]. The output produced by
the S-box implementation is listed in Tab. B.1.
69
Additional Simulations
0.150.2
0.250.3
0.35
0.20.30.40.50.60.7
0.80.9
15
20
25
30
35
40
w
n
 (µm)wp (µm)
D
el
ay
 (n
s)
(a) C2MOS XOR delay
0.150.2
0.250.3
0.35
0.20.40.60.8
3500
4000
4500
5000
5500
6000
6500
7000
w
n
 (µm)wp (µm)
Po
w
er
 (p
W
)
(b) C2MOS XOR power consumption
Figure B.4: Effect of transistor sizing in subthreshold on the C2MOS XOR-
gate
Table B.1: S-box simulated output values (in hexadecimal form)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f
00 63 7c 77 7b f2 6b 6f c5 30 01 67 2b fe d7 ab 76
10 ca 82 c9 7d fa 59 47 f0 ad d4 a2 af 9c a4 72 c0
20 b7 fd 93 26 36 3f f7 cc 34 a5 e5 f1 71 d8 31 15
30 04 c7 23 c3 18 96 05 9a 07 12 80 e2 eb 27 b2 75
40 09 83 2c 1a 1b 6e 5a a0 52 3b d6 b3 29 e3 2f 84
50 53 d1 00 ed 20 fc b1 5b 6a cb be 39 4a 4c 58 cf
60 d0 ef aa fb 43 4d 33 85 45 f9 02 7f 50 3c 9f a8
70 51 a3 40 8f 92 9d 38 f5 bc b6 da 21 10 ff f3 d2
80 cd 0c 13 ec 5f 97 44 17 c4 a7 7e 3d 64 5d 19 73
90 60 81 4f dc 22 2a 90 88 46 ee b8 14 de 5e 0b db
a0 e0 32 3a 0a 49 06 24 5c c2 d3 ac 62 91 95 e4 79
b0 e7 c8 37 6d 8d d5 4e a9 6c 56 f4 ea 65 7a ae 08
c0 ba 78 25 2e 1c a6 b4 c6 e8 dd 74 1f 4b bd 8b 8a
d0 70 3e b5 66 48 03 f6 0e 61 35 57 b9 86 c1 1d 9e
e0 e1 f8 98 11 69 d9 8e 94 9b 1e 87 e9 ce 55 28 df
f0 8c a1 89 0d bf e6 42 68 41 99 2d 0f b0 54 bb 16
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Abstract—For ultra-low-power applications, operating the
transistors in their subthreshold region is an effective way of
reducing the power dissipation of a circuit. This paper presents
a comparative study of the performance of seven D-flip-flop cells
operating in the subthreshold region, based on simulations in a
90 nm CMOS technology. Simulations have been performed with
a supply voltage ranging from 150mV to 350mV. The best PDP
and EDP numbers at 175mV is 13 aJ and 10 yJs, respectively.
I. INTRODUCTION
Flip-flops plays an important role in the power dissipation of
modern synchronous digital circuits. Several methods for re-
ducing the power dissipation of flip-flops have been proposed.
Among the most promising methods, reducing the power
supply voltage reduces the power dissipation dramatically [1].
This method has been known for decades [2], but has received
more attention with the increasing demand for power-efficient
electronics in recent years.
When the supply voltage is decreased below the threshold
voltage of a transistor, the transistor is said to operate in its
subthreshold region. Subthreshold operation is considered to
be the most energy-efficient solution for low-power applica-
tions where performance is of secondary importance [3], [4].
II. ENERGY CONSUMPTION IN CMOS
The total power dissipation of a circuit can be expressed
as the sum of the static and the dynamic power dissipation
component [5]. In traditional CMOS circuitry operating with
a power supply voltage significant above the transistors thresh-
old voltage, the dynamic power dissipated while charging and
discharging of the circuit capacitance during transistor switch-
ing has been the dominant power dissipation component.
The dynamic power dissipation can be approximated with
[6]:
Pdyn =
1
2
· α · CL · V
2
DD · f (1)
where α is the probability of a signal transition within a clock
period, CL is the circuit capacitance to switch, VDD is the
power supply voltage and f is the clock frequency.
From this equation, it can be observed that the dynamic
power dissipation depends quadratically on the power supply
voltage, hence reducing VDD is an effective way to reduce the
dynamic power dissipation.
Static power dissipation occurs due to non-ideal secondary
CMOS effects such as subthreshold leakage current and other
leakage currents in the transistor. Assuming a constant leakage
current, the static power dissipation is given as [5]:
Pstatic = IstaticVDD (2)
Subthreshold leakage current for Vgs < Vtn for an n-type
MOS transistor is given by [4] :
Ids = I0e
(1−κ)Vbs/VT eκVgs/VT
(
1− e−Vds/VT + Vds/V0
)
(3)
where Vgs is the gate-to-source voltage, Vds is the drain-to-
source voltage, Vbs is the substrate-to-source voltage (known
as the body effect), I0 is the zero-bias current for the given
device, VT is the temperature voltage, VT = kT/q, V0 is the
Early voltage, and κ is the effectiveness of the gate potential
in controlling the channel current.
By reducing the supply voltage, and thus also Vgs, below the
threshold voltage, the transistor channel is never fully inverted,
but operates in weak or moderate inversion when the transistor
is in its ’on’ state. For a n-type MOS transistor, weak inversion
occurs when Vgs is approximately 100mV or more below the
threshold voltage Vtn, and strong inversion occurs when Vgs
is 100mV or more above Vtn. The region between weak and
strong inversion is called moderate inversion [7].
III. FLIP-FLOPS
An optimal flip-flop has low power dissipation, imposes
no delay and gives a valid output at all time. In practical
implementation, trade-offs between these parameters must be
done.
Among significant parameters for characterizing a flip-
flop’s operation is its speed. Finding the maximum operating
frequency of a flip-flop can be achieved by measuring the total
delay required for a valid output is available after the input
has been stabilized [8].
The delay of a flip-flop can be expressed as the time taken
from the input changes to the output has stabilized. This delay
can be expressed as tdelay = tsetup + tctq, where tsetup is the
time taken for the input to stabilize in the flip-flop and tctq is
the time taken from the clock goes high to a valid output Q is
available. From this conclusion, we get the following equation
for the maximum delay of a flip-flop:
tdelay = max ((tsetup + tctq) ,HL , (tsetup + tctq),LH )) (4)
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where HL is high-to-low transition.
Another important parameter is the power dissipation. The
dynamic power dissipation of a flip-flop is data-pattern depen-
dent and is directly proportional to the switching activity α
[6]. The maximum power dissipation is reflected by applying
a sequence 010101... (α = 1), while the minimum power
dissipation is reflected by applying a constant high or low
input signal (α = 0).
For this characterization of flip-flop cells performance in
subthreshold operation, seven widely used and/or referred flip-
flop cells have been selected. The selection has been based on
the results from [9]. See Fig. 1 and 2 for schematic layout
of cells. Sizing of transistors have been presented in Table
I for all flip-flop cells except the TSPC flip-flop, which the
transistors width in µm have been included in the schematic
in Fig. 2(a) instead for clarifying reasons. For the PowerPC
603 flip-flop, a transistor width ofWp = 0.24µm has been used
for the feed-back C2MOS transistors, while Wp = 0.36µm
has been used for all other p-type MOS transistors.
1) Basic NAND flip-flop: The basic NAND flip-flop is
constructed out of NAND-gates. Each NAND-based
latch require 16 transistors.
2) Transmission-gate Master-Slave flip-flop: The TGMS
flip-flop is composed of two transmission gate based
latches operating on complementary clocks. This flip-
flop may be sensitive to clock-skew of it’s two comple-
mentary clock-phases.
3) C2MOS flip-flop: Build on the C2MOS-logic style [10].
This flip-flop is in contrary to the TGMS insensitive of
overlapping clocks.
4) PowerPC 603: This flip-flop is a combination of the
TGMS and C2MOS flip-flops, using clocked inverters
instead of feedback transmission gates. It was used in
the PowerPC 603 microprocessor data-path [11].
Three dynamic flip-flop-cells have also been tested. Dy-
namic flip-flop-cells use less transistors compared to their
static counterparts, but suffers from only being able to drive a
limited load and having a minimum operating frequency be-
cause of charge leakage on dynamic nodes due to subthreshold,
gate and junction leakage.
5) True Single-Phase Clock flip-flop: The TSPC flip-flop
require only one clock signal, and not its complementary
[12]. This flip-flop produces a momentary glitch on the
output when the input is low, regardless of the previous
state of the output [5]. Transistor dimensioning shown
in Fig. 2(a) is based on the results of [9].
6) Dynamic Transmission-gate Master-Slave: This flip-flop
is built from a pair of back-to-back dynamic latches. As
well as the static TGMS, the dynamic TGMS malfunc-
tions if the clocks overlaps.
7) Dynamic C2MOS flip-flop: A dynamic version of the
C2MOS flip-flop. The feed-back element in the latches
has been removed.
For flip-flop requiring two phased clock, the complementary
clock is produced using an in-cell inverter.
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Fig. 1. Static flip-flop cells
TABLE I
TRANSISTOR SIZING
Flip-flop cell Wn (µm) Ln (µm) Wp (µm) Lp (µm)
Basic NAND 0.2 0.2 0.36 0.2
TGMS 0.24 0.2 0.36 0.2
C2MOS 0.24 0.2 0.36 0.2
PowerPC 603 0.24 0.2 0.36 / 0.24 0.2
Dynamic TGMS 0.24 0.2 0.36 0.2
Dynamic C2MOS 0.24 0.2 0.36 0.2
IV. RESULTS
The characterization of the flip-flop cells have been achieved
by simulation on a 90 nm standard CMOS process with a
threshold voltage of Vtn = 0.24V and Vtp = -0.29V.
All flip-flops are simulated with a power supply voltage
ranging from 350mV down to 150mV at an operating fre-
quency of 1MHz. For power dissipation analysis, a maximum
power dissipation pattern α = 1 and no external load was
applied. For verifying operability and delay characterization
the test bench setup in Fig. 2(d) has been used, and the input
waveform from Fig. 3(a) was applied.
Figure 4 shows the simulation result for all seven circuits,
regarding delay tdelay, power dissipation, power-delay product
(PDP) and energy-delay product (EDP), with respect to VDD.
Table II presents the figures for VDD = 150mV.
V. DISCUSSION
The simulation result of the basic NAND flip-flop shows
a delay time of 284 ns and a power dissipation of 717 pW.
Increasing the power supply voltage to approximately the
threshold voltage, VDD = 250mV, the delay time decreases to
                       ﬀ ﬁ ﬂ     ﬃ   
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Fig. 2. Dynamic flip-flop cells and test bench
TABLE II
FLIP-FLOPMETRICS, VDD = 150MV
Flip-flop cell Delay [ns] Power [pW] PDP [aJ] EDP [yJs]
Basic NAND 284.2 716.6 203.7 578.9
TGMS 129.8 332.7 43.2 56.0
C2MOS 129.6 350.6 45.4 58.8
PowerPC 603 119.7 284.9 34.1 40.8
TSPC 121.2 279.0 33.8 41.0
Dyn. TGMS 83.7 199.4 16.7 14.0
Dyn. C2MOS 77.9 165.5 12.9 10.0
38 ns while the power dissipation increases to 1.7 nW. These
results are the worst overall results in this simulation.
The dynamic TGMS and the dynamic C2MOS shows the
best performance on all figures regarding delay and power
dissipation, with the C2MOS version slightly better than the
TGMS. At 250mV, the delay time and power dissipation of
the dynamic TGMS and dynamic C2MOS are 12.7 ns/ 455 pW
and 10.1 ns/ 402 pW, respectively. But as shown in Fig. 3(h),
the output signal of the dynamic C2MOS with the load of
two inverters gets significantly degraded as the power supply
voltage is lowered below the threshold limit.
For driving a high load, the static PowerPC 603 flip-flop
shows the best overall performance, with a delay time of 16 ns
and a power dissipation of 666 pW at 250mV. If the flip-flop is
driving a lower load, the dynamic TGMS cell offers less delay
and power dissipation, providing 20% lower delay time and
30% lower power dissipation compared to the PowerPC 603
flip-flop at VDD 250mV. Dynamic flip-flops lack the ability are
not able to hold the output signal for a long period of time,
and should not be used in combination with power saving
techniques such as idle and sleep mode.
Analysis of the TSPC flip-flop shows that it provides a
medium delay compared to the other flip-flops tested. From
the transient analysis in Fig. 3(f), the effect of a glitch on the
output when D is low for following periods can clearly be
seen in the second period. While increasing the power supply
voltage to 300mV, it shows a power dissipation in the middle
of the other test results. But as the power supply voltage is
being increased to 350mV, the power dissipation increases
almost by a factor of 3 with 50mV increase in VDD.
When the flip-flops are operated in the subthreshold region,
the power dissipation Ptotal is dominated by the static power
dissipation component Pstatic. Because of this, the power
dissipation increases approximately linear with increasing VDD
 ! " # " " !  $  % ! & ' ( % ' ) # $ * ( ( + , - # ( ( % . / / /
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Fig. 4. Simulation results
(2), as shown in Fig. 4(b). The power dissipation increases
faster as the transistors are operated in stronger inversion.
This effect is especially seen for the TSPC flip-flop, where
the average power dissipation increases with a factor 1 when
VDD is increased from 250mV to 300mV and a factor 2.9
when VDD is increased by another 50mV to 350mV.
Both the PDP and EDP results in Fig. 4(c) and 4(d) show a
reduction in figures as the power supply voltage is increased.
Looking at the time delay and power dissipation development
in Fig. 4(a) and 4(b), it is seen that the delay time decreases
faster that the power dissipation increases. This observation
indicates that flip-flops may not benefit from being operated
in the subthreshold region for applications where operation
speed is of a concern. Work done on characterization of
combinational logic in the subthreshold region [13], shows
that the PDP decreases while lowering the supply voltage for
this logic type. This would indicate that complete IC systems
with a combination of combinational and sequential logic may
benefit of operating in the subthreshold region with regards to
the PDP metrics.
Studies done in [14] on a FFT-processor indicates that the
best delay vs. energy dissipation relationship occurs when the
transistors are operated with a power supply voltage between
350mV and 400mV for that particular case.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has examined subthreshold performance of seven
commonly used flip-flop-cells. A power dissipation as low as
165.5 pW has been achieved at a supply voltage of 150mV.
Low power dissipation is important in some low-power appli-
cation, and lowering the supply voltage is the most effective
way of decreasing the power dissipation. This comes at the
cost of the performance.
Based on the simulation results, it is shown that dynamic
flip-flops such as the dynamic TGMS and the dynamic C2MOS
shows both the lowest delay and average power dissipation
when the switching activity factor α is high. By operating
in the subthreshold region, the subthreshold leakage effect
that degrades the maximum holding time of dynamic cells
is reduced, it is achieved to reduce discharging of dynamic
nodes, which may effect the reliability of dynamic cells if its
not taken into account when designing the circuit.
If a static flip-flop topology is desired, the PowerPC 603
flip-flop cell offers both the best delay time and power
dissipation for this design topology with a delay time of 120 ns
and a power dissipation of 285 pW at VDD = 150mV.
For practical implementation on a circuit with combina-
tional logic, a supply voltage as low as 150mV may not be
possible to achieve because of process variations [15], [16].
All simulations have been performed on typical process
corners at room temperature. For a more extensive analysis of
the flip-flop cells with respect of minimum operation voltage
and performance, simulation with different transistor dimen-
sioning on layout at different process corners and with respect
to temperature variations, as well as statistical mismatch would
be instructive [16].
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Abstract— This paper examines three different flip-flop designs
in subthreshold operation. All flip-flops are simulated in a 65 nm
and 90 nm process with a supply voltage ranging from 125 mV to
1 V. Process variations are examined at different process corners.
Successful operations of a PowerPC 603 flip-flop at all process
corners with a supply voltage down to 125 mV is shown at 65 nm.
The best PDP and EDP numbers of flip-flops design at VDD =
200 mV in this paper are 53.6 aJ and 0.88 yJs, respectively.
I. INTRODUCTION
Several methods for reducing the power consumption of
flip-flops have been proposed. Among the most promising
methods, reducing the power supply voltage offers the most
direct and dramatic means of reducing the power consumption
[1]. When the supply voltage VDD is decreased below the
absolute value of a transistors threshold voltage VT , the tran-
sistor is said to operate in its subthreshold region. Presently,
subthreshold operation is considered to be the most energy-
efficient solution for low-power applications where perfor-
mance is of secondary importance [2], [3]. This method has
been known for decades [4], but has in recent years received
more attention with the increasing demand for power-efficient
electronics. Applications well suitable for subthreshold opera-
tions include wearable medical equipment such as hearing aids
and pacemakers, wrist-watch computers, self-powered devices
and wireless sensor networks [2], [5], [6].
Three flip-flop designs, based on results from [7] and [8],
have been chosen for characterization in this work. These flip-
flops are characterized operating with a power supply voltage
ranging from deep subthreshold operation at VDD = 125mV
to nominal superthreshold for the processes being used, VDD
= 1V. A brief introduction to energy consumption nature of
CMOS is given in Sec. II. In Sec. III a presentation of selected
flip-flop designs is given. Simulation results including delay
timing, power consumption, Power-Delay Product and Energy-
Delay Product, as well as process corners characterizations are
presented in Sec. IV and discussed in Sec. V. Summary and
conclusion are given in Sec. VI.
II. ENERGY CONSUMPTION IN CMOS
The total power dissipation of a circuit can be expressed
as the sum of the static and the dynamic power dissipation
components [9]. The dynamic power has been the dominant
power dissipation component in traditional CMOS, operating
with a power supply voltage significant above the transistors
threshold voltage.
The dynamic power dissipation, dissipated while charg-
ing and discharging the circuit capacitance during transistor
switching, can be approximated to [10]:
Pdynamic =
1
2
· α · CL · V 2DD · f (1)
where α is the probability of a signal transition within a
clock period, CL is the circuit capacitance to switch, VDD
is the power supply voltage and f is the clock frequency.
The dynamic power dissipation depends quadratically on the
power supply voltage, hence reducing VDD is an effective way
to reduce the dynamic power dissipation.
Static power dissipation occurs due to non-ideal secondary
CMOS effects such as subthreshold leakage current and other
leakage currents in the transistor. Assuming a constant leakage
current, the static power dissipation is given as the product of
the leakage current and VDD [9]. Subthreshold leakage current
for Vgs < VTn for an n-type MOS transistor is given by [3] :
Ids = I0e
(1−κ)Vbs/VteκVgs/Vt
(
1− e−Vds/Vt + Vds/V0
)
(2)
where Vgs is the gate-to-source voltage, Vds is the drain-to-
source voltage, Vbs is the substrate-to-source voltage (known
as the body effect), I0 is the zero-bias current for the given
device, Vt is the temperature voltage, Vt = kT/q, V0 is the
Early voltage, and κ is the effectiveness of the gate potential
in controlling the channel current.
By reducing the power supply voltage with 100mV in
subthreshold operation, the on-current Ion is reduced with a
factor of 10 [6]. Such reduction leads to huge reduction in
power consumption.
III. FLIP-FLOPS
Three widely used flip-flop designs have been selected
for testing, based on the most promising candidates from
simulations done in [7] and [8]. Fig. 1 shows schematic
drawings of the designs. The PowerPC 603 is a master-slave
flip-flop using transmission gate latches with C2MOS-based
logic [11] in feed-back elements [12]. The Sense-Amplifier
based flip-flop (SAFF) [13] consists of a sense-amplifier and
a S-R latch capturing the output of the sense-amplifier. SAFF
flip-flop was reported to work at the lowest VDD in comparison
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Fig. 1. Flip-flop designs and test bench setup
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Fig. 2. Ratio between nMOS and pMOS currents in 65 nm and 90 nm process,
Wn = Wp and Ln = Lp
to other flip-flops tested in [10]. In the same work, SAFF also
showed the best overall performance. Dynamic C2MOS is a
dynamic master-slave flip-flop built on the C2MOS logic style,
where the feed-back elements are removed. An inverter has
been added for producing a two phased clock for the PowerPC
603 and dynamic C2MOS flip-flops.
Sizing of flip-flops operating in the subthreshold region
should be done with other p/n-ratio than normal superthreshold
CMOS. For minimum VDD operation, the same current should
go through the pMOS and nMOS transistor at the switching
point [14], [15]. As shown in Fig. 2 it can be observed how
the conductivity of an nMOS and pMOS transistor behave
in respect to VDD. For the test setup, Vgs−high = VDD has
been used. For the 65 nm general purpose process used under
the simulation, it is clearly shown how the transistor sizing
must be changed for optimal sizing with respect of the supply
voltage. Sizing used in this work is listed in Tab. I. For this
paper, a relationship of Wp = 0.67Wn has been chosen for
this process. From the result in Fig. 2 it is indicated that this
will give the best result at approximately VDD = 150mV.
Running with a supply voltage of 150mV at room temper-
ature is well above the theoretical lower limit, reported to be
in the range from 36mV to 80mV in current technologies by
[16]. In the same work, it is stated that 100mV can prove to be
a practical lower limit for implementations. Some sort of more
advanced logic than only inverters must be able to function,
i.e. NAND and NOR gates. The lower limit at 36mV is not
likely to be reached by any technology according to [17].
TABLE I
TRANSISTOR SIZING
Flip-flop cell Wn (µm) Ln (µm) Wp (µm) Lp (µm)
PowerPC 65 nm 0.18 0.6 0.12 0.6
SAFF 65 nm 0.12 0.6 0.36 0.6
Dyn. C2MOS 65 nm 0.24 0.12 0.12 0.12
PowerPC 90 nm 0.12 0.1 0.36 0.1
SAFF 90 nm 0.12 0.1 0.12 0.1
Dyn. C2MOS 90 nm 0.12 0.1 0.36 0.1
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Fig. 3. Simulation results
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
Flip-flop design characterization is achieved by simulation
in general purpose 90 nm and 65 nm processes available from
STMicroelectronics. For the 90 nm process, threshold voltages
are given as VTn = 0.24V and VTp = -0.29V, while the 65 nm
process has VTn ∼ 0.21V and VTp ∼ -0.17V. Flip-flops are
simulated with VDD ranging from 125mV to 1V.
The test-bench setup from [7] has been used. Timing delay
simulations have been simulated at a constant clock frequency
of 1MHz, while power consumption are calculated with
simulations at maximum frequency, 1f = tdelay. A maximum
power consumption pattern α = 1 is applied.
Simulation results for all flip-flop designs in the 90 nm and
65 nm process are shown in Fig. 3, regarding delay tdelay,
power consumption, Power-Delay Product (PDP) and Energy-
Delay Product (EDP), with respect to VDD. The dynamic
C2MOS design was unable to operate correctly at 65 nm with
minimum sized gates. With an increased gate length, as listed
in Tab. I, this design was able to operate correctly.
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Fig. 4. Corners at different supply voltages
In general, flip-flops in the 65 nm process show a lower
delay time at the cost of higher power consumption compared
to the same flip-flop designs in the 90 nm process. For sub-
threshold operations, the PowerPC 603 has an increase in the
EDP value of 10 times in the 90 nm process compared to the
65 nm process, while the SAFF shows a higher EDP value in
65 nm at low power supply voltages.
At 65 nm, PowerPC 603 provides better delay and EDP
figures than SAFF and dynamic C2MOS. Dynamic C2MOS has
the lowest power consumption and PDP figures at subthreshold
power supply voltages. At 90 nm, dynamic C2MOS has the
lowest delay time, while SAFF has the best power and PDP
results. In the supply voltage range between 175mV and
400mV, SAFF provides the best EDP, while dynamic C2MOS
has lowest EDP figures at other values of VDD.
Performance metrics at different process corners are shown
in Fig. 4. This figure shows the delay time and corresponding
power consumption at process corners. The lines are drawn
to make it easier to differ one design from another. Corners
failing during simulation (due to stuck-at-zero/ stuck-at-one or
tdelay > 0.5tperiod) are not drawn. A visualization of number
of successful corners with respect to power supply voltage is
shown in Fig IV. It is shown that the 65 nm process is able to
work successful in all corners at the lowest VDD for this test
setup. PowerPC603 operates successfully at 125mV and SAFF
at 150mV in 65 nm, while both designs works successfully in
all corners at 175mV in 90 nm. The dynamic C2MOS requires
at least VDD = 225mV for ensuring successful operation in
all corners in 90 nm.
The ratio between the FF and SS corners is shown in Fig. 5
with respect to VDD. According to figures, the relative differ-
ence between corners are significantly higher in subthreshold.
Tab. II shows selected metrics in the TT corner at VDD =
200mV. Lowest VDD refers to the lowest simulated VDD where
the flip-flop successfully operates in all five corners.
V. DISCUSSION
By reducing the supply voltage, power consumption of a
single flip-flop may be reduced with as much as a factor
of 20.000, according to Fig 3(b). This comes at the cost
of increased delay time and thus lower maximum operat-
ing frequency. Many applications have power consumption
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management as primary concern and may have negligible
timing requirements. Subthreshold CMOS may prove to be
an excellent choice of technology for such applications.
As growing power-density emerge as a major challenge
of todays and future CMOS technologies, due to circuits
increased power density, efforts for decreasing the grow-
ing power-density trend must be done. In combination with
massive parallelism and pipelining, it may be possible to
maintain high performance and throughput while running in
the subthreshold regime [16]. If so, performance of flip-flops
may play a crucial part of the circuits overall performance.
According to simulation results, power consumption metric
benefits most from subthreshold operation in comparison with
the other metrics. In Fig. V, metrics of PowerPC 603 at 65 nm
for power supply voltage at 1V and 125mV are compared,
and reduction factor with subthreshold operation is shown.
As shown in the figure, PDP benefits from deep subthreshold
operation in addition to power consumption. Timing and EDP
metrics do not benefit from operating at this supply voltage
in comparison with the other metrics. In Fig. V, metrics of
PowerPC 603 in 65 nm, running with power supply voltage of
1V and 125mV, are compared, and the increased performance
when running in subthreshold operation compared to normal
superthreshold operation is shown for each metric.
Transistor sizing must be done with target supply voltage
in mind. Due to random doping fluctuations, the σ for VT
variation is proportional to 1/
√
WL, so this will produce worst
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TABLE II
FLIP-FLOPMETRICS @ VDD = 200 MV, TT PROCESS CORNER
Cell name tsetup thold tCCQ tdelay
PowerPC 603, 65 nm 2.7 ns 2.4 ns 4.3 ns 6.9 ns
SAFF, 65 nm 0.23 ns 17.5 ns 19.4 ns 19.6 ns
Dynamic C2MOS, 65 nm 11.0 ns 1.2 ns 12.4 ns 23.3 ns
PowerPC 603, 90 nm 17.8 ns 24.3 ns 26.7 ns 44.3 ns
SAFF, 90 nm 1.5 ns 29.2 ns 35.7 ns 36.8 ns
Dynamic C2MOS, 90 nm 19.0 ns 0.40 ns 14.8 ns 33.7 ns
Cell name Power PDP EDP VDDmin
PowerPC 603, 65 nm 18.5 nW 127.6 aJ 0.88 yJs 125mV
SAFF, 65 nm 6.9 nW 136.1 aJ 2.67 yJs 150mV
Dynamic C2MOS, 65 nm 2.7 nW 63.6 aJ 1.48 yJs 250mV
PowerPC 603, 90 nm 3.3 nW 153.7 aJ 6.81 yJs 175mV
SAFF, 90 nm 1.5 nW 53.6 aJ 1.97 yJs 175mV
Dynamic C2MOS, 90 nm 2.6 nW 88.1 aJ 2.97 yJs 225mV
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Fig. 7. Metrics improvement factor at VDD = 125mV vs. VDD = 1V
case random VT mismatch [18]. Mismatch of VT leads to
different current drive of nMOS and pMOS transistors, which
may result in circuit failure. Body-bias regulations has been
presented as a promising method for decreasing VT variations
[19]. VT is stabilized by regulating the back-gate voltage of
transistors with a small bias regulator circuit.
Simulations of the dynamic C2MOS show some problems
with running at low frequency. Due to its dynamic design,
it lacks the ability to hold a signal for a longer period of
time because of leakage currents. This makes this flip-flop
design less ideal for use in subthreshold circuits with very
low operating frequency or for designs with sleep mode ability.
At 65 nm, this circuits requires 250mV of supply voltage for
running successfully in all corners.
Further simulations exploring performance at different tem-
peratures would be instructive, as well would chip implemen-
tation for verification of simulations.
VI. CONCLUSION
According to the International Technology Roadmap for
Semiconductors, power management is presently the primary
issue across most CMOS application segments [20]. Dramatic
measures must be taken to reduce the overall power consump-
tion. Subthreshold operation is the most dramatic way to obtain
reduction in power consumption.
Three different flip-flops has been tested for operation in
the subthreshold region in a 90 nm and a 65 nm process at
different process corners through simulations. As simulations
indicates, flip-flops function well with VDD scaled down in the
subthreshold region. According to our simulations, PowerPC
603 at 65 nm offers the best delay time, 28.7 ns, at VDD =
125 mV. At the same supply voltage, SAFF at 90 nm offers
the lowest power consumption, 256 pW, dynamic C2MOS at
90 nm offers the best PDP figure, 39.1 aJ, and PowerPC 603
at 65 nm offers the best EDP figure, 1.99 yJs.
Simulations indicate that flip-flops are able to operate at
most process corners at very low supply voltages without
malfunction. The test results indicate that the PowerPC 603
static flip-flop cell would be best suitable for ultra-low-voltage
operation, as it operates successful at all process corners at
125mV in the 65 nm process.
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Abstract— Countermeasures against side-channel attacks of
cryptographic circuits have become of great concern when
designing cryptographic and other sorts of circuits requiring
secure handling of data. This paper suggests using subthreshold
implementation for protection against power analysis attacks and
presents a comparative analysis of a standard static CMOS 8-bit
full adder cell, simulated in a 90 nm CMOS process, operating
in the subthreshold and superthreshold region. A comparison
of the correlation between input data and instantaneous power
consumption is done. Circuit simulation and statistical analysis
show that subthreshold operation gives orders of magnitude
lower correlation between power consumption and data.
I. INTRODUCTION
As cryptographic algorithms have become more secure
against cryptoanalysis attack, several types of side channel
attacks (SCA) on cryptographic IC have been reported (e.g.
[1], [2]). Such attacks are physical attacks on the implementa-
tion of the circuit, exploiting physical measurable informa-
tion emitted by the device, such as time delay and power
consumption. With the increasing demand for secure data
communication, it is becoming of greater importance to design
with protection against side channel attacks in mind for certain
applications. Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attack [2] is
an effective SCA of great concern, based on statistical analysis
of power consumption patterns.
Operating circuits with power supply voltage below the
threshold voltage of transistors is a dramatic way to reduce
the power dissipation [3], at the expense of operation speed.
When the supply voltage VDD is decreased below a transistors
threshold voltage VT , the transistor is said to operate in its
subthreshold region. The Ion/Ioff ratio can be reduced with
as much as a factor of approximately 103 if VDD is reduced
from 1V down to 150mV. Research on subthreshold operation
also indicates that the dynamic power consumption component
is reduced, while the static power dissipation component is
dominating the power dissipation. This can be used to make it
harder to detect the switching activity, and therefore improve
resistance against power analysis attack with subthreshold
operation. Subthreshold implementations of large circuits have
been proven to work in e.g. [4], [5].
It was shown in [6] how reduction of power supply voltage
reduces the current profile of an AES crypto-processor. This
paper intend to investigate the use of subthreshold supply
voltage for protection against SCA. This work is inspired by
the comparative analysis of logic styles done in [7] at normal
supply voltages. A static CMOS 8-bit ripple carry adder is used
for measuring the correlation between input data and instanta-
neous power consumption [8] at subthreshold operation with
a power supply voltage, VDD, of 200mV and superthreshold
operation at the nominal power supply voltage of the process
being used, VDD = 1V. In [9], the use of floating gate
techniques in combination with subthreshold operation was
presented as a method for increasing the resistance against
SCA.
II. SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACKS
When cryptography is used in computer systems, these
ciphers are prone to attack on their physical implementation,
denoted SCA. It was shown in [2] how a cryptographic
cipher implemented in an electronic circuit produces timing
information, power consumption variations due to switching
activity and radiates electromagnetic traces that can easily be
measured and abused for finding the secret key at a low cost.
A power analysis type of SCA uses the variation in power
consumption correlated to the operations done to calculate the
secret key being used. An effective power analysis attack was
presented in [2] and was named DPA. In [10], a successful
attack on an actual cryptographic circuit implementation was
presented. This implementation of the attack required only
4000 measurement to extract the right 8 MSB of the secret
encryption key of a hardware implementation of the AES
cryptographic algorithm.
Reducing the signal magnitude and the power dissipation
are two methods proposed for reducing the side-channel
information leaked through the chip. By reducing VDD into
the subthreshold region, exponential reduction in the power
consumption is achieved.
III. TEST SETUP AND SIMULATION RESULTS
A circuit with instantaneous current uncorrelated to input
signals is secure from SCA [8]. For measuring the resistance
against power analysis attack, the correlation between the input
vector and the corresponding current drawn from the power
supply has been calculated.
The power consumption of the adder and the input drivers
are taken into account, as well as the output loads [8].
A standard static CMOS full adder used for subthreshold
operation in [11] is chosen as the building block for the 8-
bit ripple adder. Transistor sizing from [11] is used in a 90 nm
978-1-4244-2277-7/08/$25.00 ©2008 IEEE
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(a) Current drawn, VDD = 1V (b) Current drawn, VDD =
200mV
Fig. 1. Power consumption for 1000 random input combinations
(a) std, IVDD@VDD = 1V (b) std, IVDD@VDD = 200mV
Fig. 2. Correlation between input values and power dissipation
1V CMOS process. For each power supply voltage simulated,
1000 random combinations of two 8-bit signals wasare applied
as input signals, and the corresponding power consumption is
measured as the current drawn from the power supply. The
power consumption of the adder, the input drivers and the
output loads are taken into account.
Fig. 1 shows the simulated power consumption as the instan-
taneous current drawn from the power supply in superthreshold
and subthreshold operation for 1000 input combinations. Max-
imum current for VDD = 1V is 600µA, while the maximum
current for VDD = 200mV is 0.41µA.
The standard deviation (std) of the current drawn from the
power supply is shown in Fig 2. For making comparison of the
different power supply voltage easier, the standard deviation is
normalized [8]. At superthreshold operation, highest maximum
normalized standard deviation, 1.0, occurs. The maximum nor-
malized standard deviation when VDD = 200mV is 0.00052.
IV. DISCUSSION
By reducing VDD the supply voltage down into the sub-
threshold region, our simulation results shows that the corre-
lation between input signal and power consumption, measured
as current drawn from VDD, is reduced with a factor of 1900,
while the circuits calculation time is increased with a factor
of approximately 600. As the signal magnitude is decreased,
the signal-to-noise ratio increases, making the circuit more
sensitive to noise.
Fig. 2 shows that the highest variance of the power con-
sumption occurs at the start of calculation, when input data
changes. After the initial calculation has been done, the carry
starts to ripple through the adder. After the calculation is
completed, the power consumption is negligible.
While a reduction in the correlation between the input signal
and the power consumption is achieved, a complete protection
against power analysis attacks is not attained while some
degree of correlation exists. Subthreshold operation makes
SCA harder to perform, but does not offer complete protection.
Further investigation on the reduction of signal magnitude
by combining subthreshold operation with logic styles where
power consumption has been reported to be less sensitive to
switching activity (e.g. [7], [8], [12]) would be of high interest
for making cryptographic circuits more resistant against SCA.
Chip measurements would be helpful for verification.
V. CONCLUSION
In modern cryptosystems SCA emerge as a major security
threat. Design of a cryptographic circuits must be done with
minimization of side-channel information leakage in mind.
This paper has through simulations on a 8 bit full adder
shown how subthreshold operation can reduce the correlation
between data being processed and power dissipation measured
as current drawn from the power supply voltage with a factor
of 1900, at the cost of 600 times longer calculation time. As
indicated by simulations, standard CMOS logic operated in the
subthreshold region provides orders of magnitude improved
security against power analysis attacks.
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Abstract— Operation in subthreshold region is tested for in-
creasing resistance of the AES S-box against power analysis
attacks. The non-linear S-box (Substitute Bytes) operation is one
of the major building blocks of the AES algorithm. A compact
4 stage pipelined and asynchronous S-box is implemented in
90 nm CMOS technology. The S-box is simulated in normal
superthreshold and subthreshold operation. The correlation and
standard deviation of instantaneous power consumption is cal-
culated. Our simulation results indicate orders of magnitude
lower correlation between power consumption and processed
data. The increased resistance against power analysis attacks
comes at the cost of 340 times longer execution time. Our S-
box has a throughput of 7.37 Mbit/s in subthreshold operation.
The throughput is increased to 19.88 Mbit/s when introducing 4
pipeline stages.
I. INTRODUCTION
Several types of side-channel attacks on cryptographic ICs
have been reported lately [1]–[3]. Side-channel attacks are
physical attacks on the implementation of the circuit exploiting
physical measurable information emitted by the device, such as
time delay and power consumption. Side-channel attacks have
become a major threat to implementation of modern cryp-
tographic ciphers immune against cryptoanalysis attacks. A
cryptographic cipher implemented in an IC produces variation
in power consumption and electromagnetic radiation due to
switching activity of transistors. These variations are easily
measurable with physical access to the IC, and may be used
to extract internal information from the circuit. Differential
Power Analysis (DPA) attack [2] is an effective side-channel
attack of great concern, based on statistical analysis of power
consumption patterns.
In [3], a successful DPA attack on an actual implementation
was presented. The attacker extracted the correct 8 MSB
of the secret encryption key in a hardware implementation
of the AES cryptographic algorithm [4] by measuring the
variance in power consumption when different input vectors
were applied. A successful attack has reported power traces
of 8000 encryptions as sufficient to extract the secret key
of an unprotected AES implementation [5], [6]. The attacker
required less than 3 minutes to extract the key. In comparison,
2128 tests are required to brute force the AES algorithm. It
corresponds to an increase in attack time of 4.25 · 1034 times
compared to the number of tests required for a successful DPA
attack.
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Fig. 1. nMOS transistor current Ids as a function of VDD, Vgs = VDD
The average power consumption of a single CMOS gate can
be expressed as [7]:
Pdynamic = CLV
2
DDP0→1f (1)
where CL is the gate’s load capacitance, VDD is the power
supply voltage, f the clock frequency and P0→1 is the prob-
ability that charging of an internal node occurs. By reducing
VDD into the subthreshold region, quadratically reduction in
the power consumption is achieved.
Operating circuits with power supply voltage below the
transistor’s threshold voltage is a dramatic way to reduce the
power dissipation of circuits [8]. Transistors are said to operate
in their subthreshold region when the supply voltage, VDD, is
decreased below the absolute value of the threshold voltage,
|Vt|. In Fig. 1, the on-current going through a nMOS-transistor,
Ids, is plotted as the function of the power supply voltage,
VDD. As seen in the figure, the Ion/Ioff relationship can be
reduced with as much as a factor of approximately 103 if
VDD is reduced from 1V down to 150mV. Reduced signal
amplitude will be an advantage in a cryptography system
as it makes it harder to measure side-channel information
[2]. The reduction has a significant effect on the differential
power analysis as well. The dynamic power consumption
component is significantly reduced compared to the static
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Fig. 2. S-box implementation
TABLE I
GATE COUNT
Design Asynchronous Pipelined
Logic gates 212 212
Sequencing gates 0 45
Total number of gates 212 257
power consumption when operating in the subthreshold region.
These effects can be used to make it harder to detect the
switching activity and thereby improving resistance against
power analysis attacks with subthreshold operation [9].
It was shown in [10] how reduction in supply voltage
reduces the current profile of an AES cryptographic processor.
Subthreshold operation was used for increasing the DPA resis-
tance in an 8-bit adder in [9]. This paper intend to investigate
the use of subthreshold operation for increased protection
against DPA attacks in an AES S-box implementation. The
non-linear S-box operation is one of the major building block
in the AES algorithm [11].
Different 8-bit adder designs were used for measuring
the correlation between input data and instantaneous supply
current in [12]. In [13], [14], floating gate techniques in
combination with subthreshold operation were presented as
a technique for increasing side-channel attacks resistance.
A brief introduction to subthreshold operation and side-
channel attacks is given in this section. In Sec. II, the im-
plementation of the S-box is described. A description of the
test setup used in this paper is given in Sec. III. Simulation
results are presented in Sec. IV and discussed in Sec. V.
The contribution done in this work is summarized in Sec. V
together with a conclusion.
II. S-BOX IMPLEMENTATION
The S-box operation consists of two operations. First, an
inversion in the finite field GF(28) modulo the irreducible
polynomial m(x) = x8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1 is done. The
second operation is an affine transformation Y = AX−1 + b,
where A is a 8 × 8 fixed matrix and b is a 8 × 1 vector-
matrix. A common way to optimize the S-box implementa-
tion is to use finite field arithmetic for transformation from
GF(28) to GF(((22)2)2) [15]–[17]. In our implementation,
the proposed implementation by Mentens et al. in [16] was
used for a compact implementation of the S-box with the
polynomial Px(x) = x
2 + x + λ, λ = zy. Fig. 2 illustrates
our implementation with conversion between fields and affine
transformation.
The transformation matrix used is:

b0
b1
b2
b3
b4
b5
b6
b7


=


1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1




a0
a1
a2
a3
a4
a5
a6
a7


where ai, bi ∈ GF(2) are the coefficients of a ∈ GF(2
8),
b ∈ GF(((22)2)2). The resulting inverse transformation matrix
with affine transformation is:

b0
b1
b2
b3
b4
b5
b6
b7


=


1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0




a0
a1
a2
a3
a4
a5
a6
a7


+


1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0


where ci, di ∈ GF(2) are the coefficients of c ∈
GF(((22)2)2), b ∈ GF(28).
The constant multiplication with λ is implemented with 4
XOR gates [16]. Other multiplications are implemented using
Mastrovito composite field multipliers [17] while additions are
implemented using XOR-gates.
The implementation is done in a 90 nm process from
STMicroelectronics with Vt,n = 0.24V and Vt,p = -0.29V,
using a total of 164 C2MOS XOR-gates and 48 AND-gates.
A sense-amplifier based flip-flop [18] is used as the sequencing
element. This flip-flop is able to drive a high load for a
longer period of time and performs well in subthreshold
operation [18]. An overview of the number of gates required
in the implementation is given in Tab. I. Logic gates refer to
arithmetic functions in the S-Box, while sequencing gates are
number of overhead gates used for pipelining the circuit, i.e.
flip-flops and clock buffers.
III. TEST SETUP
A circuit where the instantaneous supply current is uncor-
related to input signals is secure against side channel attacks
[12]. For measuring the resistance against power analysis
attack, the correlation between the input vector and the cor-
responding current drawn from the power supply has been
calculated.
Fig. 3 shows the simulation test bench setup, based on the
test bench from [12]. The power consumption of the S-box
and the input drivers are taken into account, as well are the
output loads. For each power supply voltage simulated, all
possible 256 input combinations of the 8-bit signal are applied
as input signals and the corresponding power consumption is
measured as the current drawn from the power supply. Power
consumption of S-box, input drivers and output loads are taken
into account, as illustrated in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 4. Metrics of asynchronous S-box
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
The power supply voltage of the asynchronous S-Box
implementation is stepped up from 125mV to 1V in Fig. 4.
Performance metrics taken into account are the calculation
time and average power consumption at maximum operation
speed. The PDP and EDP values are also calculated and
plotted. The lowest simulated PDP value is obtained when
VDD = 250mV and is 68.8 fJ, while the lowest simulated
EDP value is obtained when VDD = 750mV and is 1.36 zJs.
Fig. 5 shows the simulated instantaneous supply current
in conventional superthreshold operation and subthreshold
operation. Variations in supply current usage for different
applied input vectors are clearly visible in the plots.
The standard deviation (std.) of the supply current is calcu-
lated in Matlab and normalized, such that the highest standard
deviation value equals 1. The normalized std. is plotted in Fig.
6 for both values of VDD. While the maximum normalized
std. when operated at VDD = 1V equals 1, the maximum
normalized std. is reduced to approx. 0.0004 in subthreshold
operation.
(a) Current drawn at VDD = 1V,
asynchronous S-box
(b) Current drawn at VDD = 1V,
pipelined S-box
(c) Current drawn at VDD =
200mV, asynchronous S-box
(d) Current drawn at VDD =
200mV, pipelined S-box
Fig. 5. Power consumption for all input combinations
TABLE II
SIMULATION RESULTS
Design Calculation time Throughput
Asynchronous 1V 3.12 ns 2.56 Gbits
Pipelined 1V 5.03 ns 6.36 Gbits
Asynchronous 200mV 1085.64 n 7.37 Mbits
Pipelined 200mV 1609.69 ns 19.88 Mbits
V. DISCUSSION
Subthreshold operation reduces the standard deviation with
a factor of 2500 according to Fig. 6(b). Although subthreshold
operation offers increased resistance against power analysis
attacks, circuits are not fully protected against attacks as
long as there exists some correlation between the processed
data and the instantaneous supply current. Subthreshold oper-
ation should be considered implemented together with other
countermeasure techniques for improved resistance. Promising
reported techniques include differential masking, random noise
addition and blinding [6], [12], [19].
As subthreshold operation trades reduced power consump-
tion against decreased operation speed, it is mainly applicable
for ultra-low-power systems without high throughput require-
ments. Throughput in subthreshold circuits can be significantly
improved by adding more pipeline stages to the circuit.
Pipelining increases the throughput but does also increase the
calculation time for individual bytes due to sequencing over-
head delay. The power consumption increases as well when
pipelining is introduced. The increased power consumption
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(b) Standard deviation of IVDD at VDD = 200mV
Fig. 6. Correlation between input values and power dissipation
should be taken into account when considering pipelining.
As the threshold voltage varies with process variations,
subthreshold circuits are more sensitive to process variations
compared to superthreshold circuits. Statistical process and
temperature variation simulations as well as chip implemen-
tation would be instructive for verifying correct operation.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article presents a compact AES S-Box running in the
subthreshold regime. Simulations indicate increased resistance
against power analysis attacks with subthreshold operation.
The correlation between power dissipation of different input
values decreases with a factor of 2500 at the cost of 350 times
delay degradation when applying subthreshold operation. The
power consumption is 1.2mW when operating at 1 V. When
running at 200mV, the power consumption is reduced to
0.13µW.
Future works include analyzing the impact of process
variations. Further gate-level optimizations are possible for
reducing the total number of gates. This can be done with
synthesis tools. For example, some of the AND gates can
be replaced by NAND gates, offering smaller implementation
[20]. Chip implementation of a complete cryptographic system
should be considered for a more extensive analysis.
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